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In this paper, we study the method of closure games, a game-theoretic valuation method for languages of self-referential truth developed by the author. We prove two theorems which jointly establish that the method of closure games characterizes all 3- and 4-valued strong Kleene fixed points in a novel, informative manner. Among others, we also present closure games which induce the minimal and maximal intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene schema.
We classify a sharp phase transition threshold for Friedman’s finite adjacent Ramsey theorem. We extend the method for showing this result to two previous classifications involving Ramsey theorem variants: the Paris–Harrington theorem and the Kanamori–McAloon theorem. We also provide tools to remove ad hoc arguments from the proofs of phase transition results as much as currently possible.
In his dissertation, Wadge defined a notion of guessability on subsets of the Baire space and gave two characterizations of guessable sets. A set is guessable if and only if it is in the second ambiguous class (), if and only if it is eventually annihilated by a certain remainder. We simplify this remainder and give a new proof of the latter equivalence. We then introduce a notion of guessing with an ordinal limit on how often one can change one’s mind. We show that for every ordinal , a guessable set is annihilated by applications of the simplified remainder if and only if it is guessable with fewer than mind changes. We use guessability with fewer than mind changes to give a semi-characterization of the Hausdorff difference hierarchy, and indicate how Wadge’s notion of guessability can be generalized to higher-order guessability, providing characterizations of for all successor ordinals .
In this short paper, we describe another class of forcing notions which preserve measurability of a large cardinal from the optimal hypothesis, while adding new unbounded subsets to . In some ways these forcings are closer to the Cohen-type forcings—we show that they are not minimal—but, they share some properties with treelike forcings. We show that they admit fusion-type arguments which allow for a uniform lifting argument.
This paper contains a proof-theoretic account of unification in transitive reflexive modal logics, which means that the reasoning is syntactic and uses as little semantics as possible. New proofs of theorems on unification types are presented and these results are extended to negationless fragments. In particular, a syntactic proof of Ghilardi’s result that has finitary unification is provided. In this approach the relation between classical valuations, projective unifiers, and admissible rules is clarified.
We study the non-Fregean propositional logic with propositional quantifiers, denoted by . We prove that does not have the finite model property and that it is undecidable. We also present examples of how to interpret in various mathematical theories, such as the theory of groups, rings, and fields, and we characterize the spectra of -sentences. Finally, we present a translation of into a classical two-sorted first-order logic, and we use the translation to prove some model-theoretic properties of .
We introduce a general notion of semantic structure for first-order theories, covering a variety of constructions such as Tarski and Kripke semantics, and prove that, over Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF), the completeness of such semantics is equivalent to the Boolean prime ideal theorem (BPI). Using a result of McCarty (2008), we conclude that the completeness of Kripke semantics is equivalent, over intuitionistic Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (IZF), to the Law of Excluded Middle plus BPI. Along the way, we also prove the equivalence, over ZF, between BPI and the completeness theorem for Kripke semantics for both first-order and propositional theories.
This paper investigates how naive theories of truth fare with respect to a set of extremely plausible principles of restricted quantification. It is first shown that both nonsubstructural theories as well as certain substructural theories cannot validate all those principles. Then, pursuing further an approach to the semantic paradoxes that the author has defended elsewhere, the theory of restricted quantification available in a specific naive theory that rejects the structural property of contraction is explored. It is shown that the theory validates all the principles in question, and it is argued that other prima facie plausible principles that the theory fails to validate are objectionable on independent grounds.