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2016 Restriction by Noncontraction
Elia Zardini
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 57(2): 287-327 (2016). DOI: 10.1215/00294527-3429057

Abstract

This paper investigates how naive theories of truth fare with respect to a set of extremely plausible principles of restricted quantification. It is first shown that both nonsubstructural theories as well as certain substructural theories cannot validate all those principles. Then, pursuing further an approach to the semantic paradoxes that the author has defended elsewhere, the theory of restricted quantification available in a specific naive theory that rejects the structural property of contraction is explored. It is shown that the theory validates all the principles in question, and it is argued that other prima facie plausible principles that the theory fails to validate are objectionable on independent grounds.

Citation

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Elia Zardini. "Restriction by Noncontraction." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 57 (2) 287 - 327, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-3429057

Information

Received: 1 September 2012; Accepted: 14 October 2013; Published: 2016
First available in Project Euclid: 28 January 2016

zbMATH: 06585189
MathSciNet: MR3482748
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1215/00294527-3429057

Subjects:
Primary: 03
Secondary: A05, B20, B47, B53, B65

Rights: Copyright © 2016 University of Notre Dame

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Vol.57 • No. 2 • 2016
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