Translator Disclaimer
2017 Inferentialism and Quantification
Owen Griffiths
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 58(1): 107-113 (2017). DOI: 10.1215/00294527-3768059

Abstract

Logical inferentialists contend that the meanings of the logical constants are given by their inference rules. Not just any rules are acceptable, however: inferentialists should demand that inference rules must reflect reasoning in natural language. By this standard, I argue, the inferentialist treatment of quantification fails. In particular, the inference rules for the universal quantifier contain free variables, which find no answer in natural language. I consider the most plausible natural language correlate to free variables—the use of variables in the language of informal mathematics—and argue that it lends inferentialism no support.

Citation

Download Citation

Owen Griffiths. "Inferentialism and Quantification." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 58 (1) 107 - 113, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-3768059

Information

Received: 23 September 2013; Accepted: 24 May 2014; Published: 2017
First available in Project Euclid: 25 November 2016

zbMATH: 06686420
MathSciNet: MR3595344
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1215/00294527-3768059

Subjects:
Primary: 03B10, 03B35, 03B65

Rights: Copyright © 2017 University of Notre Dame

JOURNAL ARTICLE
7 PAGES

This article is only available to subscribers.
It is not available for individual sale.
+ SAVE TO MY LIBRARY

SHARE
Vol.58 • No. 1 • 2017
Back to Top