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Tarski defined a way of assigning to each Boolean algebra, B, an invariant inv(B) ∈ In, where In is a set of triples from ℕ, such that two Boolean algebras have the same invariant if and only if they are elementarily equivalent. Moreover, given the invariant of a Boolean algebra, there is a computable procedure that decides its elementary theory. If we restrict our attention to dense Boolean algebras, these invariants determine the algebra up to isomorphism. In this paper we analyze the complexity of the question "Does B have invariant x?" For each x ∈ In we define a complexity class Γx that could be either Σⁿ, Πⁿ, Σⁿ ∧ Πⁿ, or Πω+1 depending on x, and we prove that the set of indices for computable Boolean algebras with invariant x is complete for the class Γx. Analogs of many of these results for computably enumerable Boolean algebras were proven in earlier works by Selivanov. In a more recent work, he showed that similar methods can be used to obtain the results for computable ones. Our methods are quite different and give new results as well. As the algebras we construct to witness hardness are all dense, we establish new similar results for the complexity of various isomorphism problems for dense Boolean algebras.
There are many parallels between the role of possible worlds in modal logic and that of times in tense logic. But the similarities only go so far, and it is important to note where the two come apart. This paper argues that even though worlds and times play similar roles in the model theories of modal and tense logic, there is no tense analogue of the possible-worlds analysis of modal operators. An important corollary of this result is that presentism cannot be the tense analogue of actualism.
Which intermediate propositional logics can prove their own completeness? I call a logic reflexive if a second-order metatheory of arithmetic created from the logic is sufficient to prove the completeness of the original logic. Given the collection of intermediate propositional logics, I prove that the reflexive logics are exactly those that are at least as strong as testability logic, that is, intuitionistic logic plus the scheme $\neg φ ∨ \neg\neg φ. I show that this result holds regardless of whether Tarskian or Kripke semantics is used in the definition of completeness. I also show that the operation of creating a second-order metatheory is injective, thereby insuring that I am actually considering each logic independently.
We study the connection between factors of the Medvedev lattice and constructive logic. The algebraic properties of these factors determine logics lying in between intuitionistic propositional logic and the logic of the weak law of the excluded middle (also known as De Morgan, or Jankov, logic). We discuss the relation between the weak law of the excluded middle and the algebraic notion of join-reducibility. Finally we discuss autoreducible degrees.
Let P be the ω-orbit of a point under a unary function definable in an o-minimal expansion ℜ of a densely ordered group. If P is monotonically cofinal in the group, and the compositional iterates of the function are cofinal at +\infty in the unary functions definable in ℜ, then the expansion (ℜ, P) has a number of good properties, in particular, every unary set definable in any elementarily equivalent structure is a disjoint union of open intervals and finitely many discrete sets.
After an introduction to set the stage, we consider some variations on the reasoning behind Curry's Paradox arising against the background of classical propositional logic and of BCI logic and one of its extensions, in the latter case treating the "paradoxicality" as a matter of nonconservative extension rather than outright inconsistency. A question about the relation of this extension and a differently described (though possibly identical) logic intermediate between BCI and BCK is raised in a final section, which closes with a handful of questions left unanswered by our discussion.