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2013 Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly
Aiyuan Tao, Yingjun Zhu, Xiangqing Zou
J. Appl. Math. 2013(SI08): 1-7 (2013). DOI: 10.1155/2013/320712

Abstract

In the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms, the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader. This paper studies and compares total welfare in a sequential-move mixed duopoly when either the public firm or the private firm acts as the leader. It is found that the fact that which firm is the leader affects total welfare and that whether firms compete in quantity or price also affects the optimal choice of market leader.

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Aiyuan Tao. Yingjun Zhu. Xiangqing Zou. "Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly." J. Appl. Math. 2013 (SI08) 1 - 7, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/320712

Information

Published: 2013
First available in Project Euclid: 14 March 2014

zbMATH: 06950615
MathSciNet: MR3131003
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1155/2013/320712

Rights: Copyright © 2013 Hindawi

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Vol.2013 • No. SI08 • 2013
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