Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
- Volume 49, Number 2 (2008), 153-176.
Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge
Fitch's argument purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. The argument exploits the fact that the knowledge predicate or operator is untyped and may thus apply to sentences containing itself. This article outlines a response to Fitch's argument based on the idea that knowledge is typed. The first part of the article outlines the philosophical motivation for the view, comparing it to the motivation behind typing truth. The second, formal part presents a logic in which knowledge is typed and demonstrates that it allows nonlogical truths to be knowable yet unknown.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 49, Number 2 (2008), 153-176.
First available in Project Euclid: 15 May 2008
Permanent link to this document
Digital Object Identifier
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
Zentralblatt MATH identifier
Primary: 03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
Paseau, Alexander. Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 49 (2008), no. 2, 153--176. doi:10.1215/00294527-2008-005. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1210859925