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We extend Meyer's 1972 investigation of sets of minimal indices. Blum showed that minimal index sets are immune, and we show that they are also immune against high levels of the arithmetic hierarchy. We give optimal immunity results for sets of minimal indices with respect to the arithmetic hierarchy, and we illustrate with an intuitive example that immunity is not simply a refinement of arithmetic complexity. Of particular note here are the fact that there are three minimal index sets located in Π3 − Σ3 with distinct levels of immunity and that certain immunity properties depend on the choice of underlying acceptable numbering. We show that minimal index sets are never hyperimmune; however, they can be immune against the arithmetic sets. Lastly, we investigate Turing degrees for sets of random strings defined with respect to Bagchi's size-function s.
In a paper from the 1980s, Byrd claims that the logic of "eventual permanence" for linear time is KD5. In this note we take up Byrd's novel argument for this and, treating the problem as one concerning translational embeddings, show that rather than KD5 the correct logic of "eventual permanence" is KD45
Fitch's argument purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. The argument exploits the fact that the knowledge predicate or operator is untyped and may thus apply to sentences containing itself. This article outlines a response to Fitch's argument based on the idea that knowledge is typed. The first part of the article outlines the philosophical motivation for the view, comparing it to the motivation behind typing truth. The second, formal part presents a logic in which knowledge is typed and demonstrates that it allows nonlogical truths to be knowable yet unknown.
It is well known that in any nonstandard model of (Peano arithmetic) neither addition nor multiplication is recursive. In this paper we focus on the recursiveness of unary functions and find several pairs of unary functions which cannot be both recursive in the same nonstandard model of (e.g., , , and ). Furthermore, we prove that for any computable injection , there is a nonstandard model of in which is recursive.
We prove, by using the concept of schematic interpretation, that the natural embedding from the category ISL, of intuitionistic sentential pretheories and i-congruence classes of morphisms, to the category CSL, of classical sentential pretheories and c-congruence classes of morphisms, has a left adjoint, which is related to the double negation interpretation of Gödel-Gentzen, and a right adjoint, which is related to the Law of Excluded Middle. Moreover, we prove that from the left to the right adjoint there is a pointwise epimorphic natural transformation and that since the two endofunctors at CSL, obtained by adequately composing the aforementioned functors, are naturally isomorphic to the identity functor for CSL, the string of adjunctions constitutes an adjoint cylinder. On the other hand, we show that the operators of Lindenbaum-Tarski of formation of algebras from pretheories can be extended to equivalences of categories from the category CSL, respectively, ISL, to the category Bool, of Boolean algebras, respectively, Heyt, of Heyting algebras. Finally, we prove that the functor of regularization from Heyt to Bool has, in addition to its well-known right adjoint (that is, the canonical embedding of Bool into Heyt) a left adjoint, that from the left to the right adjoint there is a pointwise epimorphic natural transformation, and, finally, that such a string of adjunctions constitutes an adjoint cylinder.
De Cock and Kerre, in considering Poincaré paradox, observed that the intuitive notion of "approximate similarity" cannot be adequately represented by the fuzzy equivalence relations. In this note we argue that the deduction apparatus of fuzzy logic gives adequate tools with which to face the question. Indeed, a first-order theory is proposed whose fuzzy models are plausible candidates for the notion of approximate similarity. A connection between these structures and the point-free metric spaces is also established.