Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Constructive Modelings for Theory Change

Pavlos Peppas and Mary-Anne Williams


Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson have developed and investigated a set of rationality postulates which appear to capture much of what is required of any rational system of theory revision. This set of postulates describes a class of revision functions, however it does not provide a constructive way of defining such a function. There are two principal constructions of revision functions, namely an epistemic entrenchment and a system of spheres. We refer to their approach as the AGM paradigm. We provide a new constructive modeling for a revision function based on a nice preorder on models, and furthermore we give explicit conditions under which a nice preorder on models, an epistemic entrenchment, and a system of spheres yield the same revision function. Moreover, we provide an identity which captures the relationship between revision functions and update operators (as defined by Katsuno and Mendelzon).

Article information

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 36, Number 1 (1995), 120-133.

First available in Project Euclid: 19 December 2002

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Zentralblatt MATH identifier

Primary: 03B60: Other nonclassical logic
Secondary: 03C90: Nonclassical models (Boolean-valued, sheaf, etc.) 68T27: Logic in artificial intelligence


Peppas, Pavlos; Williams, Mary-Anne. Constructive Modelings for Theory Change. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 36 (1995), no. 1, 120--133. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040308831.

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