One of the most fruitful applications of substructural logics stems from their capacity to deal with self-referential paradoxes, especially truth-theoretic paradoxes. Both the structural rules of contraction and the rule of cut play a crucial role in typical paradoxical arguments. In this paper I address a number of difficulties affecting noncontractive approaches to paradox that have been discussed in the recent literature. The situation was roughly this: if you decide to go substructural, the nontransitive approach to truth offers a lot of benefits that are not available in the noncontractive account. I sketch a noncontractive theory of truth that has these benefits. In particular, it has both a proof- and a model-theoretic presentation, it can be extended to a first-order language, and it retains every classically valid inference.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
60(4):
559-585
(November 2019).
DOI: 10.1215/00294527-2019-0020
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