In this paper we study symmetric inference systems (that is, pairs of inference systems) as refutation systems characterizing maximal logics with certain properties. In particular, the method is applied to paraconsistent logics, which are natural examples of such logics.

I present a novel interpretation of Frege's attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29--31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege's proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege's proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which it may successfully be applied.

We suggest a method of finding a notion of type to abstract elementary classes and determine under what assumption on these types the class has a well-behaved homogeneous and universal "monster" model, where homogeneous and universal are defined relative to our notion of type.