Open Access
Translator Disclaimer
Fall 1997 Information and Impossibilities
Jon Barwise
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38(4): 488-515 (Fall 1997). DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039540766

Abstract

In this paper I explore informationalism, a pragmatic theory of modality that seems to solve some serious problems in the familiar possible worlds accounts of modality. I view the theory as an elaboration of Stalnaker's moderate modal realism, though it also derives from Dretske's semantic theory of information. Informationalism is presented in Section 2 after the prerequisite stage setting in Section 1. Some applications are sketched in Section 3. Finally, a mathematical model of the theory is developed in Section 4.

How many times have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth? (Arthur Conan Doyle)

You've put me in an impossible situation. (Anonymous)

[N]othing we imagine is absolutely impossible. (David Hume)

Citation

Download Citation

Jon Barwise. "Information and Impossibilities." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38 (4) 488 - 515, Fall 1997. https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1039540766

Information

Published: Fall 1997
First available in Project Euclid: 10 December 2002

zbMATH: 0920.03002
MathSciNet: MR1648849
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039540766

Subjects:
Primary: 03A05
Secondary: 03B45

Rights: Copyright © 1997 University of Notre Dame

JOURNAL ARTICLE
28 PAGES


SHARE
Vol.38 • No. 4 • Fall 1997
Back to Top