Abstract
In this paper I explore informationalism, a pragmatic theory of modality that seems to solve some serious problems in the familiar possible worlds accounts of modality. I view the theory as an elaboration of Stalnaker's moderate modal realism, though it also derives from Dretske's semantic theory of information. Informationalism is presented in Section 2 after the prerequisite stage setting in Section 1. Some applications are sketched in Section 3. Finally, a mathematical model of the theory is developed in Section 4.
How many times have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth? (Arthur Conan Doyle)
You've put me in an impossible situation. (Anonymous)
[N]othing we imagine is absolutely impossible. (David Hume)
Citation
Jon Barwise. "Information and Impossibilities." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38 (4) 488 - 515, Fall 1997. https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1039540766
Information
