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Fall 1997 Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach
Daniel Nolan
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38(4): 535-572 (Fall 1997). DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039540769


Reasoning about situations we take to be impossible is useful for a variety of theoretical purposes. Furthermore, using a device of impossible worlds when reasoning about the impossible is useful in the same sorts of ways that the device of possible worlds is useful when reasoning about the possible. This paper discusses some of the uses of impossible worlds and argues that commitment to them can and should be had without great metaphysical or logical cost. The paper then provides an account of reasoning with impossible worlds, by treating such reasoning as reasoning employing counterpossible conditionals, and provides a semantics for the proposed treatment.


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Daniel Nolan. "Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38 (4) 535 - 572, Fall 1997.


Published: Fall 1997
First available in Project Euclid: 10 December 2002

zbMATH: 0916.03013
MathSciNet: MR1648852
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039540769

Primary: 03A05
Secondary: 03B45 , 03B53

Rights: Copyright © 1997 University of Notre Dame


Vol.38 • No. 4 • Fall 1997
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