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In 1936 Tarski sketched a rigorous definition of the concept of logical consequence which, he claimed, agreed quite well with common usage—or, as he also said, with the common concept of consequence. Commentators of Tarski’s paper have usually been elusive as to what this common concept is. However, being clear on this issue is important to decide whether Tarski’s definition failed (as Etchemendy has contended) or succeeded (as most commentators maintain). I argue that the common concept of consequence that Tarski tried to characterize is not some general, all-purpose notion of consequence, but a rather precise one, namely the concept of consequence at play in axiomatics. I identify this concept and show that Tarski’s definition is fully adequate to it.
We review some of the history of the computability theory of functionals of higher types, and we will demonstrate how contributions from logic and theoretical computer science have shaped this still active subject.
We show that each of the five basic theories of second order arithmetic that play a central role in reverse mathematics has a natural counterpart in the language of nonstandard arithmetic. In the earlier paper  we introduced saturation principles in nonstandard arithmetic which are equivalent in strength to strong choice axioms in second order arithmetic. This paper studies principles which are equivalent in strength to weaker theories in second order arithmetic.