Abstract
The idea of a property's being supervenient on a class of properties is familiar from much philosophical literature. We give this idea a linguistic turn by converting it into the idea of a predicate symbol's being supervenient on a set of predicate symbols relative to a (first order) theory. What this means is that according to the theory, any individuals differing in respect to whether the given predicate applies to them also differ in respect to the application of at least one of the predicates in the set. The latter relationship we show turns out to coincide with something antecedently familiar from work on definability: with what is called the piecewise (or modelwise) definability, in the theory in question, of the given predicate in terms of those in the set.
Citation
Lloyd Humberstone. "Note on Supervenience and Definability." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 39 (2) 243 - 252, Spring 1998. https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1039293066
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