Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Irrevocable Belief Revision in Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Krister Segerberg


In this paper we present a new modeling for belief revision that is what we term irrevocable. This modeling is of philosophical interest since it captures some features of suppositional reasoning, and of formal interest since it is closely connected with AGM, yet provides for iterated belief revision. The analysis is couched in terms of dynamic doxastic logic.

Article information

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 39, Number 3 (1998), 287-306.

First available in Project Euclid: 6 December 2002

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Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)

Zentralblatt MATH identifier

Primary: 03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
Secondary: 03B60: Other nonclassical logic 68T27: Logic in artificial intelligence


Segerberg, Krister. Irrevocable Belief Revision in Dynamic Doxastic Logic. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 39 (1998), no. 3, 287--306. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039182247.

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