Temporaryism—the view that not always everything always exists—comes in two main versions: presentism and expansionism (aka the growing block theory of time). Both versions of the view are commonly formulated using the notion of being present, which we, among others, find problematic. Expansionism is also sometimes accused of requiring extraordinary conceptual tools for its formulation. In this paper, we put forward systematic characterizations of presentism and expansionism which involve neither the notion of being present nor unfamiliar conceptual tools. These characterizations are full-blown logics, each logic comprising an axiomatic proof system and an intuitive semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete.
"The Formalities of Temporaryism without Presentness." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 61 (2) 181 - 202, May 2020. https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2020-0001