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2018 A Propositional Theory of Truth
Yannis Stephanou
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 59(4): 503-545 (2018). DOI: 10.1215/00294527-2018-0013

Abstract

The liar and kindred paradoxes show that we can derive contradictions if our language possesses sentences lending themselves to paradox and we reason classically from schema (T) about truth: Sis true iffp, where the letter p is to be replaced with a sentence and the letter S with a name of that sentence. This article presents a theory of truth that keeps (T) at the expense of classical logic. The theory is couched in a language that possesses paradoxical sentences. It incorporates all the instances of the analogue of (T) for that language and also includes other platitudes about truth. The theory avoids contradiction because its logical framework is an appropriately constructed nonclassical propositional logic. The logic and the theory are different from others that have been proposed for keeping (T), and the methods used in the main proofs are novel.

Citation

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Yannis Stephanou. "A Propositional Theory of Truth." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 59 (4) 503 - 545, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2018-0013

Information

Received: 5 June 2014; Accepted: 11 May 2016; Published: 2018
First available in Project Euclid: 13 October 2018

zbMATH: 06996542
MathSciNet: MR3871899
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1215/00294527-2018-0013

Subjects:
Primary: 03B20
Secondary: 03A99, 03B50, 03B80

Rights: Copyright © 2018 University of Notre Dame

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Vol.59 • No. 4 • 2018
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