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We study the weak truth table (wtt) degree spectra of first-order relational structures. We prove a dichotomy among the possible wtt degree spectra along the lines of Knight’s upward-closure theorem for Turing degree spectra. We prove new results contrasting the wtt degree spectra of finite- and infinite-signature structures. We show that, as a method of defining classes of reals, the wtt degree spectrum is, except for some trivial cases, strictly more expressive than the Turing degree spectrum.
The signature of the formal language of mereotopology contains two predicates and , which stand for “being a part of” and “contact,” respectively. This paper will deal with the decidability issue of the mereotopological theories which can be formed by the axioms found in the literature. Three main results to be given are as follows: (1) all axiomatized mereotopological theories are separable; (2) all mereotopological theories up to , , or are finitely inseparable; (3) all axiomatized mereotopological theories except , , or , where is strictly stronger than , are undecidable. Then it can also be easily seen that all axiomatized mereotopological theories proved to be undecidable here are neither essentially undecidable nor strongly undecidable but are hereditarily undecidable. Result (3) will be shown by constructing strongly undecidable mereotopological structures based on two-dimensional Euclidean space, and it will be pointed out that the same construction cannot be carried through if the language is not rich enough.
We study a class of formulas generalizing the weak law of the excluded middle and provide a characterization of these formulas in terms of Kripke frames and Brouwer algebras. We use these formulas to separate logics corresponding to factors of the Medvedev lattice.
Halldén completeness closely resembles the relevance property. To prove Halldén completeness in terms of Kripke-style semantics, the van Benthem–Humberstone theorem is often used. In relevant modal logics, the Halldén completeness of Meyer–Fuhrmann logics has been obtained using the van Benthem–Humberstone theorem. However, there remain a number of Halldén-incomplete relevant modal logics. This paper discusses the Halldén completeness of a wider class of relevant modal logics, namely, those with some Sahlqvist axioms.
Finitely algebraizable deductive systems were introduced by Blok and Pigozzi to capture the essential properties of those deductive systems that are very tightly connected to quasivarieties of universal algebras. They include the equivalential logics of Czelakowski. Based on Blok and Pigozzi’s work, Herrmann defined algebraizable deductive systems. These are the equivalential deductive systems that are also truth-equational, in the sense that the truth predicate of the class of their reduced matrix models is explicitly definable by some set of unary equations. Raftery undertook the task of characterizing the property of truth-equationality for arbitrary deductive systems. In this paper, following Raftery, we extend the notion of truth-equationality for logics formalized as -institutions and abstract several of the results that hold for deductive systems in this more general categorical context.
This paper considers two reasons that might support Russell’s (and Whitehead’s) choice of a ramified-type theory over a simple-type theory. The first reason is the existence of purported paradoxes that can be formulated in any simple-type language, including an argument that Russell considered in 1903. These arguments depend on certain converse-compositional principles. When we take account of Russell’s doctrine that a propositional function is not a constituent of its values, these principles turn out to be too implausible to make these arguments troubling. The second reason is conditional on a substitutional interpretation of quantification over types other than that of individuals. This reason stands up to investigation: a simple-type language will not sustain such an interpretation, but a ramified-type language will. And there is evidence that Russell was tacitly inclined towards such an interpretation. A strong construal of that interpretation opens a way to make sense of Russell’s simultaneous repudiation of propositions and his willingness to quantify over them. But that way runs into trouble with Russell’s commitment to the finitude of human understanding.