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Winter 1999 Russell, Presupposition, and the Vicious-Circle Principle
Darryl Jung
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 40(1): 55-80 (Winter 1999). DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039096305


Prompted by Poincaré, Russell put forward his celebrated vicious-circle principle (vcp) as the solution to the modern paradoxes. Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine, among others, have raised two salient objections against Russell's vcp. First, Gödel has claimed that Russell's various renderings of the vcp really express distinct principles and thus, distinct solutions to the paradoxes, a claim that gainsays one of Russell's positions on the nature of the solution to the paradoxes, namely, that such a solution be uniform. Secondly, Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine have protested that the vcp's proscription against impredicative specification is incompatible with a realistic conception of the domain of quantification, a conception that Russell certainly held. I examine Russell's vcp and defend it against these objections.


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Darryl Jung. "Russell, Presupposition, and the Vicious-Circle Principle." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 40 (1) 55 - 80, Winter 1999.


Published: Winter 1999
First available in Project Euclid: 5 December 2002

zbMATH: 0968.03012
MathSciNet: MR1811203
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039096305

Primary: 03A05
Secondary: 03-03

Rights: Copyright © 1999 University of Notre Dame

Vol.40 • No. 1 • Winter 1999
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