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Spring 1997 Rethinking Quine's Argument on the Collapse of Modal Distinctions
Genoveva Martí
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38(2): 276-294 (Spring 1997). DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039724891


This paper examines and discusses an argument for the collapse of modal distincions offered by Quine in "Reference and Modality" and in Word and Object that relies exclusively on a version of the Principle of Substitution. It is argued that the argument does not affect its historical targets: Carnap's treatment of modality, presented in Meaning and Necessity, and Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation, developed by Kaplan; nor does it affect a treatment of modality inspired in Frege's treatment of oblique contexts. It is argued, nevertheless, that the immunity of those systems to Quine's argument depends on the success of their rejection of the Principle of Substitution presupposed by Quine.


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Genoveva Martí. "Rethinking Quine's Argument on the Collapse of Modal Distinctions." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38 (2) 276 - 294, Spring 1997.


Published: Spring 1997
First available in Project Euclid: 12 December 2002

zbMATH: 0898.03003
MathSciNet: MR1489414
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039724891

Primary: 03B45

Rights: Copyright © 1997 University of Notre Dame

Vol.38 • No. 2 • Spring 1997
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