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2015 The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication
Luis A. Palacio, Alexandra Cortés-Aguilar, Manuel Muñoz-Herrera
J. Appl. Math. 2015(SI3): 1-11 (2015). DOI: 10.1155/2015/910614

Abstract

This paper studies the conditions that improve bargaining power using threats and promises. We develop a model of strategic communication, based on the conflict game with perfect information, in which a noisy commitment message is sent by a better-informed sender to a receiver who takes an action that determines the welfare of both. Our model captures different levels of aligned-preferences, for which classical games such as stag hunt, hawk-dove, and prisoner’s dilemma are particular cases. We characterise the Bayesian perfect equilibrium with nonbinding messages under truth-telling beliefs and sender’s bargaining power assumptions. Through our equilibrium selection we show that the less conflict the game has, the more informative the equilibrium signal is and less credibility is necessary to implement it.

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Luis A. Palacio. Alexandra Cortés-Aguilar. Manuel Muñoz-Herrera. "The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication." J. Appl. Math. 2015 (SI3) 1 - 11, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/910614

Information

Published: 2015
First available in Project Euclid: 13 October 2015

zbMATH: 07132089
MathSciNet: MR3396024
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1155/2015/910614

Rights: Copyright © 2015 Hindawi

JOURNAL ARTICLE
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Vol.2015 • No. SI3 • 2015
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