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2015 Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game
Luca Corazzini, Marcelo Tyszler
J. Appl. Math. 2015(SI3): 1-8 (2015). DOI: 10.1155/2015/961930

Abstract

By using data from a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to assess the relative importance of efficiency concerns versus noise in accounting for subjects overcontribution in public good games. In the benchmark specification, homogeneous agents, overcontribution is mainly explained by error and noise in behavior. Results change when we consider a more general QRE specification with cross-subject heterogeneity in concerns for (group) efficiency. In this case, we find that the majority of the subjects make contributions that are compatible with the hypothesis of preference for (group) efficiency. A likelihood-ratio test confirms the superiority of the more general specification of the QRE model over alternative specifications.

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Luca Corazzini. Marcelo Tyszler. "Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game." J. Appl. Math. 2015 (SI3) 1 - 8, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/961930

Information

Published: 2015
First available in Project Euclid: 13 October 2015

zbMATH: 07132093
MathSciNet: MR3396025
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1155/2015/961930

Rights: Copyright © 2015 Hindawi

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