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2011 Cost-conscious voters in referendum elections
Kyle Golenbiewski, Jonathan Hodge, Lisa Moats
Involve 4(2): 139-155 (2011). DOI: 10.2140/involve.2011.4.139

Abstract

In referendum elections, voters are frequently required to register simultaneous yes/no votes on multiple proposals. The separability problem occurs when a voter’s preferred outcome on a proposal or set of proposals depends on the known or predicted outcomes of other proposals in the election. Here we investigate cost-consciousness as a potential cause of nonseparability. We develop a mathematical model of cost-consciousness, and we show that this model induces nonseparable preferences in all but the most extreme cases. We show that when outcome costs are distinct, cost-conscious electorates always exhibit both a weak Condorcet winner and a weak Condorcet loser. Finally, we show that preferences consistent with our model of cost-consciousness are rare in randomly generated electorates. We then discuss the implications of our work and suggest directions for further research.

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Kyle Golenbiewski. Jonathan Hodge. Lisa Moats. "Cost-conscious voters in referendum elections." Involve 4 (2) 139 - 155, 2011. https://doi.org/10.2140/involve.2011.4.139

Information

Received: 17 September 2010; Revised: 14 February 2011; Accepted: 16 February 2011; Published: 2011
First available in Project Euclid: 20 December 2017

zbMATH: 1230.91032
MathSciNet: MR2876195
Digital Object Identifier: 10.2140/involve.2011.4.139

Subjects:
Primary: 91B12

Rights: Copyright © 2011 Mathematical Sciences Publishers

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