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December 2006 Gödel’s Program revisited, Part I: the turn to phenomenology
Kai Hauser
Bull. Symbolic Logic 12(4): 529-590 (December 2006). DOI: 10.2178/bsl/1164056807

Abstract

Convinced that the classically undecidable problems of mathematics possess determinate truth values, Gödel issued a programmatic call to search for new axioms for their solution. The platonism underlying his belief in the determinateness of those questions in combination with his conception of intuition as a kind of perception have struck many of his readers as highly problematic. Following Gödel’s own suggestion, this article explores ideas from phenomenology to specify a meaning for his mathematical realism that allows for a defensible epistemology.

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Kai Hauser. "Gödel’s Program revisited, Part I: the turn to phenomenology." Bull. Symbolic Logic 12 (4) 529 - 590, December 2006. https://doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1164056807

Information

Published: December 2006
First available in Project Euclid: 20 November 2006

zbMATH: 1126.03010
MathSciNet: MR2283090
Digital Object Identifier: 10.2178/bsl/1164056807

Rights: Copyright © 2006 Association for Symbolic Logic

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Vol.12 • No. 4 • December 2006
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