In 1936 Tarski sketched a rigorous definition of the concept of logical consequence which, he claimed, agreed quite well with common usage—or, as he also said, with the common concept of consequence. Commentators of Tarski’s paper have usually been elusive as to what this common concept is. However, being clear on this issue is important to decide whether Tarski’s definition failed (as Etchemendy has contended) or succeeded (as most commentators maintain). I argue that the common concept of consequence that Tarski tried to characterize is not some general, all-purpose notion of consequence, but a rather precise one, namely the concept of consequence at play in axiomatics. I identify this concept and show that Tarski’s definition is fully adequate to it.
"What is Tarski’s common concept of consequence?." Bull. Symbolic Logic 12 (1) 1 - 42, March 2006. https://doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1140640942