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November, 1976 Coherent Preferences
Robert J. Buehler
Ann. Statist. 4(6): 1051-1064 (November, 1976). DOI: 10.1214/aos/1176343641

Abstract

De Finetti has defined coherent previsions and coherent probabilities, and others have described concepts of coherent actions or coherent decisions. Here we consider a related concept of coherent preferences. Willingness to accept one side of a bet is an example of a preference. A set of preferences is called incoherent if reversal of some subset yields a uniform increase in utility, as with a sure win for a collection of bets. In both probability and statistical models (where preferences are conditional on data) separating hyperplane theorems show that coherence implies existence of a probability measure from which the preferences could have been inferred. Relationships to confidence intervals and to decision theory are indicated. No single definition of coherence is given which covers all cases of interest. The various cases distinguish between probability and statistical models and between finite and infinite spaces. No satisfactory theory is given for continuous statistical models.

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Robert J. Buehler. "Coherent Preferences." Ann. Statist. 4 (6) 1051 - 1064, November, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343641

Information

Published: November, 1976
First available in Project Euclid: 12 April 2007

zbMATH: 0347.60002
MathSciNet: MR423618
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1214/aos/1176343641

Subjects:
Primary: 60A05
Secondary: 62A15 , 90A10

Keywords: Coherence , conditional inference , finite additivity , separating hyperplane , subjective probability , Utility

Rights: Copyright © 1976 Institute of Mathematical Statistics

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Vol.4 • No. 6 • November, 1976
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