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December 2010 Testing affiliation in private-values models of first-price auctions using grid distributions
Luciano I. de Castro, Harry J. Paarsch
Ann. Appl. Stat. 4(4): 2073-2098 (December 2010). DOI: 10.1214/10-AOAS344

Abstract

Within the private-values paradigm, we construct a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behavior at first-price auctions when bidders’ valuations are potentially dependent, but not necessarily affiliated. We develop a test of affiliation and apply our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions held by the Department of Transportation in the State of Michigan to procure road-resurfacing services: we do not reject the hypothesis of affiliation in cost signals.

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Luciano I. de Castro. Harry J. Paarsch. "Testing affiliation in private-values models of first-price auctions using grid distributions." Ann. Appl. Stat. 4 (4) 2073 - 2098, December 2010. https://doi.org/10.1214/10-AOAS344

Information

Published: December 2010
First available in Project Euclid: 4 January 2011

zbMATH: 1220.62157
MathSciNet: MR2829947
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1214/10-AOAS344

Keywords: affiliation , First-price , MTP2 , sealed-bid auctions

Rights: Copyright © 2010 Institute of Mathematical Statistics

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Vol.4 • No. 4 • December 2010
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