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2013 New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters
Zhaohan Sheng, Jianguo Du, Qiang Mei, Tingwen Huang
Abstr. Appl. Anal. 2013(SI36): 1-10 (2013). DOI: 10.1155/2013/406743

Abstract

In the real business world, player sometimes would offer a limiter to their output due to capacity constraints, financial constraints, or cautious response to uncertainty in the world. In this paper, we modify a duopoly game with bounded rationality by imposing lower limiters on output. Within our model, we analyze how lower limiters have an effect on dynamics of output and give proof in theory why adding lower limiters can suppress chaos. We also explore the numbers of the equilibrium points and the distribution of conditioned equilibrium points. Stable region of the conditioned equilibrium is discussed. Numerical experiments show that the output evolution system having lower limiters becomes more robust than without them, and chaos disappears if the lower limiters are big enough. The local or global stability of the conditional equilibrium points provides a theoretical basis for the limiter control method of chaos in economic systems.

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Zhaohan Sheng. Jianguo Du. Qiang Mei. Tingwen Huang. "New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters." Abstr. Appl. Anal. 2013 (SI36) 1 - 10, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/406743

Information

Published: 2013
First available in Project Euclid: 26 February 2014

zbMATH: 1273.91107
MathSciNet: MR3034989
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1155/2013/406743

Rights: Copyright © 2013 Hindawi

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Vol.2013 • No. SI36 • 2013
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