

84. Evaluation of Peirce's Axiom on Intermediate Kripke Models and its Application

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We deal with the intermediate propositional logics. We suppose familiarity with the intermediate logics. For those not mentioned here explicitly, we refer to our Survey [1].

The so-called Peirce's axiom P is $a \supset b \supset a \supset a$, where parentheses are omitted by assuming the association from the left. This axiom was modified by Nagata into a sequence of axioms as follows:

Definition 1. $P_1(a_0, a_1) = a_1 \supset a_0 \supset a_1 \supset a_1$,
 $P_n(a_0, \dots, a_n) = a_n \supset P_{n-1}(a_0, \dots, a_{n-1}) \supset a_n \supset a_n$.

This sequence is often used in the study of intermediate logics as a strong and convenient tool. The evaluation of axioms from this sequence is sometimes treated in literatures but the treatment seems not to be complete.

Here we give a complete treatment of the evaluation and its application for the axiomatization of infinite models.

As models for intermediate propositional logics, we take up the so-called Kripke model, which was modified and renamed as POS model by Ono (see Ono [2]). Further, we treat only finite models.

Let M be a POS model (usually, with the minimum element). We define the condition $C(W, \alpha)$ for the M -valuation W and the element α of M as follows:

Condition.

$C(W, \alpha) : W(a, \alpha) = f$ and, for any $\beta > \alpha$, $W(a, \beta) = t$.
And there exists $\beta > \alpha$ such that $W(b, \beta) = f$.

The main result of this note is the following

Theorem 2. $W(P, \alpha) = f$ if and only if there exists $\alpha_0 \geq \alpha$ such that $C(W, \alpha_0)$.

We prove the theorem through the two lemmas as below.

Lemma 3. $C(W, \alpha_0)$ implies $W(P, \alpha_0) = f$.

Proof. By the hypothesis, we have $W(a, \beta) = t$ for any $\beta > \alpha_0$. Further, there exists $\beta > \alpha_0$ such that $W(b, \beta) = f$. Hence we have $W(a \supset b, \alpha_0) = f$. So we have, for any $\gamma \geq \alpha_0$, $W(a \supset b, \gamma) = f$ or $W(a, \gamma) = t$. Hence we have $W(a \supset b \supset a, \alpha_0) = t$. Finally, from $W(a \supset b \supset a, \alpha_0)$

$=t$ and $W(a, \alpha_0) = f$, we have $W(P, \alpha_0) = f$.

Remark that the above proof does not use the finiteness of M .

Lemma 4. *If $W(P, \alpha) = f$, then there exists $\alpha_0 \geq \alpha$ such that $C(W, \alpha_0)$.*

Proof. It is obvious that $W(P, \beta) = t$ for any maximal $\beta \in M$. Since $W(P, \alpha) = f$, there exists non-maximal $\alpha_0 \geq \alpha$ such that $W(P, \alpha_0) = f$ and, for any $\beta > \alpha_0$, $W(P, \beta) = t$. From this, we have that $W(a \supset b \supset a, \alpha_0) = t$ and $W(a, \alpha_0) = f$. $W(a \supset b \supset a, \alpha_0) = t$ implies that, for any $\beta > \alpha_0$, $W(a \supset b \supset a, \beta) = t$. From this and $W(P, \beta) = t$, we have $W(a, \beta) = t$. Since $W(a, \alpha_0) = t$ comes from $W(a \supset b, \alpha_0) = t$ and $W(a \supset b \supset a, \alpha_0) = t$, it must be that $W(a \supset b, \alpha_0) = f$. Hence there exists $\beta > \alpha_0$ such that $W(a, \beta) = t$ and $W(b, \beta) = f$. So the condition $C(W, \alpha_0)$ is satisfied.

Corollary 5. *$W(P_n(a_0, \dots, a_n), \alpha) = f$ if and only if there exists a chain $\alpha_0 > \alpha_1 > \dots > \alpha_{n-1} > \alpha_n \geq \alpha$ in M such that*

$$(1) \quad W(a_0, \alpha_0) = f,$$

$$(2) \quad W(a_i, \alpha_i) = f \text{ and, for any } \beta > \alpha_i, W(a_i, \beta) = t \quad (i=1, 2, \dots, n).$$

This corollary is a refinement of Lemma 3.4 in Ono [2].

Now we define two kinds of axioms.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Definition 6.} \quad A_n &= Z(a_n, b) \vee P_n, \\ B_n &= Z(a_0, b) \vee P_n, \end{aligned}$$

where $Z(a, b) = (a \supset b) \vee (b \supset a)$ and $P_n = P_n(a_0, \dots, a_n)$ as usual.

Let \mathcal{F}_n be the set of all the finite POS models with the height $\leq n$ and \mathcal{Q}_n be the set of all the finite and irreducible POS models with the height $\leq n$.

Our next objective is to prove

$$\text{Theorem 7.} \quad (1) \quad LJ + A_n = \bigcap_{\substack{1 \leq k < \omega \\ N \in \mathcal{F}_n}} (S_k \uparrow N),$$

$$(2) \quad LJ + B_n = \bigcap_{\substack{0 \leq k < \omega \\ N \in \mathcal{Q}_n}} (N \uparrow S_k),$$

where $N \uparrow S_0$ means N itself.

Proof. As is easily seen, the axioms A_n and B_n can be rewritten as I axioms. Hence the logics $LJ + A_n$ and $LJ + B_n$ have the finite model property.

Validity. (1) Let M be a model of the form $S_k \uparrow N$ where $1 \leq k < \omega$ and $N \in \mathcal{F}_n$. Suppose that there exists an M -valuation W and an element α of M such that $W(A_n, \alpha) = f$. Since $W(P_n, \alpha) = f$, we have that $\alpha \in S_k$ by Corollary 5. Then, it must be that $W(a_n, \beta) = t$ for any $\beta \in N$, which implies that $W(Z(a_n, b), \alpha) = t$. Hence A_n is valid in M .

(2) Let M be a model of the form $N \uparrow S_k$ where $0 \leq k < \omega$ and $N \in \mathcal{Q}_n$. We suppose that $k \geq 1$ since the case $k=0$ is obvious. Suppose that $W(B_n, \alpha) = f$. Since $W(Z(a_0, b), \alpha) = f$, there exist $\beta_1, \beta_2 \geq \alpha$ such that $W(a_0, \beta_1) = t$, $W(a_0, \beta_2) = f$, $W(b, \beta_1) = f$ and $W(b, \beta_2) = t$. This implies

that $\beta_1, \beta_2, \alpha \in N$. Since $\alpha \in N \in \mathcal{G}_n$ and $W(P_n, \alpha) = f$, it must be that $W(a_0, \beta) = f$ for any $\beta \in N$ by Corollary 5. This is a contradiction. Hence B_n is valid in M .

Completeness. (1) Let M be a finite and irreducible POS model in which A_n is valid. Since M is irreducible, M can be written as $S_k \uparrow N$ with some $k \geq 1$ and some N . Let k be the possible biggest one. If N gets to be empty, then M is linear and of the required form. Suppose that N is not empty. Then N has at least two minimal elements. Suppose that $N \notin \mathcal{F}_n$. Then there exists an M -valuation W such that $W(P_n, \alpha) = f$ with a minimal element α . By this M -valuation, $W(a_n, \alpha) = f$. Further, we can suppose that $W(b, \alpha) = t$ and that, for any $\beta > \alpha$, $W(a_n, \beta) = t$ by Corollary 5. Let α' be another minimal element of N . Suppose that $W(a_n, \alpha') = t$ and $W(b, \alpha') = f$. This supposition does not interfere with $W(P_n, \alpha) = f$. Then we have $W(A_n, \gamma) = f$ for any $\gamma \in S_k$. This contradicts with the assumption that A_n is valid in M . Hence M is of the given form.

(2) Let M be a finite and irreducible POS model in which B_n is valid. M can be written as $N \uparrow S_k$ with some $k \geq 0$ and some N . Let k be the possible biggest one. If N gets to be empty, then M is of the required form. Suppose that $N \in \mathcal{G}_n$. N has at least two maximal elements. There exists a chain $\alpha_0 > \alpha_1 > \dots > \alpha_n$ in N with a maximal α_0 and the minimum α_n . Let α' be another maximal element of N . Let W be an M -valuation such that

- (1) $W(a_0, \alpha_0) = f, W(b, \alpha_0) = t,$
- (2) $W(a_i, \alpha_i) = f$ and, for any $\beta > \alpha_i, W(a_i, \beta) = t$ ($i = 1, 2, \dots, n$),
- (3) $W(a_0, \alpha') = t, W(b, \alpha') = f.$

Then, we have $W(B_n, \alpha_n) = f$, which is contradictory. Hence M is of the given form.

Corollary 8.

$$LJ + A_n = \bigcap_{N \in \mathcal{F}_n} (S_n \uparrow N),$$

$$LJ + B_n = LP_n \cap \bigcap_{N \in \mathcal{G}_n} (N \uparrow S_n),$$

$$LP_{m+n} + A_n = \bigcap_{N \in \mathcal{F}_n} (S_m \uparrow N),$$

$$LP_{m+n} + B_n = LP_n \cap \bigcap_{N \in \mathcal{G}_n} (N \uparrow S_m).$$

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References

- [1] T. Hosoi and H. Ono: Intermediate Propositional Logics (A Survey). J. Tsuda College, **5**, 67–82 (1973).
- [2] H. Ono: Kripke Models and Intermediate Logics. Publ. RIMS, Kyoto Univ., **6**, 461–476 (1970/71).