

40. On Pairs of Very-Close Formal Systems

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While we were examining mutual relations between formal systems, we were rather astonished by finding out that there exists a pair of distinct formal systems¹⁾ M_1 and M_2 and another formal system N stronger than M_1 and M_2 and satisfying the following condition $\mathfrak{C}(M_1, M_2, N)$: For any finite number of propositions ξ_1, \dots, ξ_n , the system $M_1[\xi_1, \dots, \xi_n]$ is equivalent to N if and only if $M_2[\xi_1, \dots, \xi_n]$ is so, where $M_i[\xi_1, \dots, \xi_n]$ denotes the formal system stronger than M_i by the axioms ξ_1, \dots, ξ_n ($i=1, 2$).

Any pair of formal systems M_1 and M_2 is called *very-close* if and only if they have such a formal system N that satisfies $\mathfrak{C}(M_1, M_2, N)$. Restricting to formal systems each being stronger than a certain formal system standing on a logic admitting inferences of the implication logic²⁾ by a finite number of axioms, we can find out a necessary and sufficient condition for any pair of formal systems M_1 and M_2 to be *very-close*. This short note is to exhibit a theorem which gives the condition.

The condition can be stated very simply in the case where the logic has *conjunction* as its logical constant. In this case, any number of axioms can be unified into a single axiom. Here we have: *Two formal systems M_1 and M_2 are very-close if and only if we can find out a formal system F and a pair of propositions p and q such that M_1 and M_2 lie between $F[\mathfrak{P}]$ and $F[p]$, where \mathfrak{P} stands for $(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p$.*

Taking p and q as $p_1 \wedge \dots \wedge p_s$ and $q_1 \wedge \dots \wedge q_t$, respectively, we can interpret the above theorem even in the case where we do not assume *conjunction* as a logical constant of the logic we stand on. Namely, $F[\mathfrak{P}]$ and $F[p]$ could be interpreted as $F[\mathfrak{P}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{P}_s]$ and $F[p_1, \dots, p_s]$, respectively, for appropriately defined formulas $\mathfrak{P}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{P}_s$, which would work as $(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p_i$ ($i=1, \dots, s$). This can be interpreted as

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1) Here we call any pair of formal systems *distinct* if and only if there is a proposition which is provable in one of the systems but unprovable in the other.

2) Under the *implication logic*, we understand the logic having *implication* and admitting the following inference rules: (1) \mathfrak{A} is deducible from \mathfrak{A} and $\mathfrak{A} \rightarrow \mathfrak{B}$, (2) $\mathfrak{A} \rightarrow \mathfrak{B}$ is deducible if \mathfrak{B} is deducible from \mathfrak{A} . It is the sentential part LOS of the primitive logic LO. As for LO, see [1] Ono.

$$\mathfrak{D}_1 \rightarrow (\mathfrak{D}_2 \rightarrow (\dots \rightarrow (\mathfrak{D}_t \rightarrow p_i) \dots)),$$

where \mathfrak{D}_j stands for $p \rightarrow q_j$ *i.e.*

$$p_1 \rightarrow (p_2 \rightarrow (\dots \rightarrow (p_s \rightarrow q_j) \dots)).$$

Thus we have

Theorem. *Two formal systems M_1 and M_2 are very-close if and only if we can find out a formal system F and a series of propositions $p_1, \dots, p_s; q_1, \dots, q_t$ such that M_1 and M_2 lie between $F[\mathfrak{P}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{P}_s]$ and $F[p_1, \dots, p_s]$, where each p_i is defined by*

$$\mathfrak{P}_i \equiv \mathfrak{D}_1 \rightarrow (\mathfrak{D}_2 \rightarrow (\dots \rightarrow (\mathfrak{D}_t \rightarrow p_i) \dots)),$$

$$\mathfrak{D}_j \equiv p_1 \rightarrow (p_2 \rightarrow (\dots \rightarrow (p_s \rightarrow q_j) \dots)).$$

Proof. Firstly, let us suppose that M_1 and M_2 are *very-close*, namely, that there exists a formal system N that satisfies $\mathfrak{C}(M_1, M_2, N)$. Then, we can find out a formal system F and a series of propositions $a_1, \dots, a_l; b_1, \dots, b_m; q_1, \dots, q_t$ such that M_1, M_2 , and N are equivalent to $F[a_1, \dots, a_l]$, $F[b_1, \dots, b_m]$, and $F[q_1, \dots, q_t]$, respectively. Now, we denote the series of $a_1, \dots, a_l; b_1, \dots, b_m$ by $p_1, \dots, p_s; p_{l+1}, \dots, p_s$ ($s=l+m$).

Evidently, M_1 as well as M_2 is weaker than $F[p_1, \dots, p_s]$. Hence, we have only to prove that each of them is stronger than $F[\mathfrak{P}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{P}_s]$. The condition $\mathfrak{C}(M_1, M_2, N)$ means that the proposition set $\{a_1, \dots, a_l; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ is equivalent to the proposition set $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ if and only if the proposition set $\{b_1, \dots, b_m; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ is equivalent to the proposition set $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ for any finite number of propositions ξ_1, \dots, ξ_n . We shall now show that each \mathfrak{P}_i ($i=1, \dots, s$) is deducible from a_1, \dots, a_l in F . For the case $i=1, \dots, l$, this is clear. For the case $i=l+v$ ($v=1, \dots, m$), we would like to show p_{l+v} *i.e.* b_v by assuming $a_1, \dots, a_l; \mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t$. Taking q_1, \dots, q_t for ξ_1, \dots, ξ_n of $\mathfrak{C}(M_1, M_2, N)$, we know that $\{a_1, \dots, a_l; q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ is equivalent to $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ if and only if $\{b_1, \dots, b_m; q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ is equivalent to $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$. Since $\{a_1, \dots, a_l; q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ is equivalent to $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$, $\{b_1, \dots, b_m; q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ is equivalent to $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$. Hence, each b_v is deducible from q_1, \dots, q_t . Therefore, we have only to show that q_1, \dots, q_t hold. Again, taking $\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t$ for ξ_1, \dots, ξ_n of $\mathfrak{C}(M_1, M_2, N)$, we know that $\{a_1, \dots, a_l; \mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$ is equivalent to $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ if and only if $\{b_1, \dots, b_m; \mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$ is equivalent to $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$. Since $\{b_1, \dots, b_m; \mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$ is equivalent to $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$, $\{a_1, \dots, a_l; \mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$ is equivalent to $\{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$. Hence, q_1, \dots, q_t hold by assumption. Thus, M_1 is proved to be stronger than $F[\mathfrak{P}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{P}_s]$. In the same way, we can prove that M_2 is also stronger than $F[\mathfrak{P}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{P}_s]$.

Conversely, let us assume that there exist a formal system F and a series of propositions $p_1, \dots, p_s; q_1, \dots, q_t$ such that M_1 and M_2 lie between $F[\mathfrak{P}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{P}_s]$ and $F[p_1, \dots, p_s]$. Let us further assume

that M_1 and M_2 are equivalent to $F[a_1, \dots, a_i]$ and $F[b_1, \dots, b_m]$, respectively. These assumptions imply clearly

- (1) a_u is deducible from p_1, \dots, p_s in F ($u=1, \dots, l$),
- (2) b_v is deducible from p_1, \dots, p_s in F ($v=1, \dots, m$),
- (3) \mathfrak{P}_i is deducible from a_1, \dots, a_i in F ($i=1, \dots, s$),
- (4) \mathfrak{P}_i is deducible from b_1, \dots, b_m in F ($i=1, \dots, s$).

In order to show that M_1 and M_2 are *very-close*, we show that $\{a_1, \dots, a_i; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ is equivalent to $\{\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$ if and only if $\{b_1, \dots, b_m; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ is equivalent to $\{\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$ for any finite number of propositions ξ_1, \dots, ξ_n . If we succeed to show this, we have only to take N as $F[\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t]$. Now, we show that $\{b_1, \dots, b_m; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ is equivalent to $\{\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$ by assuming that $\{a_1, \dots, a_i; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ is equivalent to $\{\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$. Clearly, $b_1, \dots, b_m; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n$ imply each \mathfrak{D}_j ($j=1, \dots, t$) in F by (1). Also $\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t$ imply $a_1, \dots, a_i; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n$ by assumption. Hence, we can prove each b_v ($v=1, \dots, m$) in F by (2) and (3). In the same way, we can prove that $\{a_1, \dots, a_i; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ is equivalent to $\{\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$ by assuming that $\{b_1, \dots, b_m; \xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ is equivalent to $\{\mathfrak{D}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{D}_t\}$. Thus, M_1 and M_2 are proved to be *very-close*.

Remark. An example pair of distinct *very-close* formal systems is given by $F[(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p]$ and $F[p]$ for any formal system F which does not admit $((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$. It is also remarkable that there is no pair of distinct *very-close* formal systems standing on any one of K -series logics.³⁾ Namely, if we assume Peirce's rule in F , two systems $F[\mathfrak{P}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{P}_s]$ and $F[p_1, \dots, p_s]$ are proved to be mutually equivalent as follows: Namely, let us assume that Peirce's rule holds in F . Then, we shall show by induction on t that each p_i ($i=1, \dots, s$) is deducible from $\mathfrak{P}_i \equiv \mathfrak{D}_1 \rightarrow (\mathfrak{D}_2 \rightarrow (\dots \rightarrow (\mathfrak{D}_t \rightarrow p_i) \dots))$ in F . To show this, let us suppose $\mathfrak{P}_i. \mathfrak{D}_2 \rightarrow (\mathfrak{D}_3 \rightarrow (\dots \rightarrow (\mathfrak{D}_t \rightarrow p_i) \dots))$ implies p_i by assumption of induction. Hence, $\mathfrak{D}_1 \rightarrow p_i$ holds. We can easily see that \mathfrak{D}_1 is equivalent to $p_i \rightarrow \mathfrak{D}_1$, so $(p_i \rightarrow \mathfrak{D}_1) \rightarrow p_i$ holds. Since we assume Peirce's rule in F , p_i is deducible in F .

Reference

- [1] Ono, K.: On universal character of the primitive logic. Nagoya Math. J., 27(1), 331-353 (1966).

3) See [1] Ono.