

## 64. Some Proof Theoretic-Properties of Dense Linear Orderings and Countable Well-Orderings

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In this paper we shall state, without proofs, some proof-theoretic results concerning dense linear orderings and countable well-orderings (Theorems A and A' below). By using them and some extended forms of relativization theorem in Motohashi [3] and [4], we shall give purely syntactic proofs of Lopez-Escobar's Theorem and Morley's Theorem on undefinability of well-orderings ((i) and (ii) of Theorem 12 in Keisler [1]).

Let  $L$  be a first order infinitary logic with countable conjunctions, countable disjunctions and equality ( $L_{\omega_1\omega}$  in the sense of H. J. Keisler's Book [1]). We assume that  $L$  has at least one binary predicate symbol  $<$  but no individual constants nor function symbols. By  $L_0$  we denote the sublogic of  $L$  which is obtained from  $L$  by deleting all the predicate symbols except  $<$ . Let  $DO$  be the axiom of dense linear orderings without endpoints and  $WO_\alpha$  be the axiom of well-orderings of type  $\alpha$ , for each countable ordinal  $\alpha$  (see Scott [2]). Then clearly  $DO$  and  $WO_\alpha$  are sentences in  $L_0$ . A formula  $A$  in  $L$  is said to be existential if  $A$  is obtained from atomic formulas and their negations by some applications of  $\wedge$  (countable conjunction),  $\vee$  (countable disjunction) and  $\exists$  (existential quantification).

Our first result is the following

**Theorem A.** *Suppose that  $A$  is an existential formula in  $L$ . Then the sentence  $DO \rightarrow A$  is provable in  $L$  if and only if the sentence  $WO_\alpha \rightarrow A$  is provable in  $L$  for some countable ordinal number  $\alpha$ .*

In order to obtain a syntactic proof of Lopez-Escobar's Theorem ((i) of Theorem 12 in [1]), we require the following form of relativization theorem which is mentioned in [3] and [4].

Suppose  $P$  is a unary predicate symbol which does not appear in  $L$ . By  $L(P)$ , we denote the logic obtained from  $L$  by adding  $P$  as a new predicate symbol. For each formula  $A$  in  $L$ , by  $A^P$  we denote the formula in  $L(P)$ , which is obtained from  $A$  by relativizing every occurrence of quantifiers in  $A$  by  $P$ . Using these notations, we can express the relativization theorem in the following required style.

**Theorem B.** *If  $A$  and  $B$  are sentences in  $L$  and  $(\exists v)P(v) \wedge A^P \rightarrow B$*

is provable in  $L(P)$ , then there is an existential sentence  $C$  in  $L$  such that  $A \rightarrow C$  and  $C \rightarrow B$  are provable in  $L$ .

By using Theorems A and B, we have the following

**Theorem C (Lopez-Escobar).** *Suppose that  $T$  is a countable set of sentences in  $L$ . Then  $(\exists v)P(v)$ ,  $DO^P$ ,  $T$  is consistent if and only if  $(\exists v)P(v)$ ,  $WO_\alpha^P$ ,  $T$  is consistent for every countable ordinal number  $\alpha$ .*

**Proof.**  $(\exists v)P(v)$ ,  $DO^P$ ,  $T$  is inconsistent

$$\iff \vdash (\exists v)P(v) \wedge DO^P \rightarrow \neg \wedge T$$

$$\iff \vdash DO \rightarrow A \text{ and } \vdash A \rightarrow \neg \wedge T \text{ for some existential sentence } A$$

$$\iff \vdash WO_\alpha \rightarrow A \text{ and } \vdash A \rightarrow \neg \wedge T \text{ for some } \alpha < \omega_1 \text{ and existential sentence } A$$

$$\iff \vdash (\exists v)P(v) \wedge WO_\alpha^P \rightarrow \neg \wedge T \text{ for some } \alpha < \omega_1$$

$$\iff (\exists v)P(v), WO_\alpha^P, T \text{ is inconsistent for some } \alpha < \omega_1. \quad \text{q.e.d.}$$

On the other hand we require more delicate arguments to obtain a syntactic proof of Morley's Theorem. For each countable admissible set  $\mathcal{A}$ , let  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$  be the sublogic of  $L_{\omega_1}$  restricted to  $\mathcal{A}$  (cf. [1]). Note the fact that  $WO_\alpha \in L_{\mathcal{A}}$  for each  $\alpha$  in  $\mathcal{A}$ . Suppose that  $A$  is an existential formula in  $L$  and  $X$  a finite set of free variables such that every free variable in  $A$  belongs to  $X$ . We define the degree of existence of  $A$  and  $X$  (denoted by  $d.e.(A, X)$ ) by the following conditions:

(i)  $d.e.(A, X) = 0$  if  $A$  is an atomic formula or its negation;

(ii)  $d.e.\left(\bigvee_{i \in I} A_i, X\right) = \sup_{i \in I} d.e.(A_i, X)$ ;

(iii)  $d.e.\left(\bigwedge_{i \in I} A_i, X\right) = \left(\sup_{i \in I} d.e.(A_i, X)\right) \cdot (n+1)$ , where  $n = \bar{X}$ ;

(iv)  $d.e.((\exists v)A(v), X) = d.e.(A(y), X \cup \{y\}) + 1$ , where  $y$  is a free variable which does not belong to  $X$ .

Clearly  $d.e.(A, X)$  is a countable ordinal number. Furthermore if  $A \in \mathcal{A}$ , then  $d.e.(A, X)$  is an ordinal number in  $\mathcal{A}$ . Note that  $d.e.(A, X) = 0$  for each open formula  $A$ . Let  $d.e.(A) = d.e.(A, \phi)$  for each existential sentence  $A$  in  $L$ , where  $\phi$  is the empty set. Then we have the following lemma which is used in the proofs of Theorem A above and Theorem A' below.

**Lemma.** *Suppose that  $A$  is an existential sentence in  $L_0$ . Then the sentence  $DO \rightarrow A$  is provable in  $L_0$  if and only if the sentence  $WO_{d.e.(A)} \rightarrow A$  is provable in  $L_0$ .*

Also we require the following form of relativization theorem which is remarked by Mr. K. Shirai.

**Theorem B'.** *If  $A$  and  $B$  are sentences in  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $(\exists v)P(v) \wedge A^P \rightarrow B$  is provable in  $L(P)_{\mathcal{A}}$ , then there is an existential sentence  $C$  in  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$  such that  $A \rightarrow C$  and  $C \rightarrow B$  are provable in  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$  and every predicate symbol in  $C$  occurs both in  $A$  and in  $B$ .*

By using our Lemma and Theorem B' we have the following

**Theorem A'.** *Suppose that  $A$  is an existential sentence in  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$ . Then the sentence  $DO \rightarrow A$  is provable in  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$  if and only if the sentence  $WO_{\alpha} \rightarrow A$  is provable in  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$  for some ordinal number  $\alpha$  in  $\mathcal{A}$ .*

By using Theorems A' and B' instead of Theorems A and B in the proof of Theorem C, we have following

**Theorem C' (Morley).** *Suppose that  $T$  is a countable set of sentences in  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$  such that  $T$  is  $\Sigma$  on  $\mathcal{A}$ . Then  $(\exists v)P(v)$ ,  $DO^P$ ,  $T$  is consistent if and only if  $(\exists v)P(v)$ ,  $WO_{\alpha}^P$ ,  $T$  is consistent for every  $\alpha$  in  $\mathcal{A}$ .*

### References

- [1] H. J. Keisler: Model Theory for Infinitary Logic. North-Holland (1971).
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- [3] N. Motohashi: Two theorems on mix-relativization. Proc. Japan. Acad., **49**, 161-163 (1973).
- [4] —: Some extensions of relativization theorem (to appear).