# THEORY OF PROCEDURES 

I. SIMPLE CONDITIONALS

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Introduction. The aim of this paper is to set up the beginnings of a logical theory of procedures, one of the major uses of which will be as a theory of computation. Much of the initial portion of the paper consists of a generalization and re-setting of the theory developed in McCarthy [6]. (For the translation of McCarthy's theory into practice, see McCarthy et al. [7].) In [9], Thiele has developed a similar theory, oriented especially toward algorithmic languages such as are used in digital computer programming. It is not to be thought that a theory of computability, such as is provided by Turing machines or Markov algorithms ${ }^{1}$ is in any way a theory of computation or a general theory of procedures. In fact the latter is used repeatedly in an informal fashion whenever one constructs Turing machines or Markov algor ithms.

In section 1, we describe informally the nature and structure of procedures, giving examples of procedures and of the way in which they may be diagrammed and symbolized. The morphology of a formal theory for procedures is set out in section 2 , and in section 3 and section 4 interpretations are given for the various parts of this formalism. In section 5 , a theorem on the eliminability of propositional operators within the theory is proved. Then in section 6 we prove a normal form theorem, which yields a sufficient condition for complete axiomatizations of procedure theory at this first level, where only simple conditionals occur.

1. The Structure of Procedures. The treatment of procedures begins from a different point from the theory of Turing machines or Markov algorithms. In these theories, a space is assumed at the very start; for Turing machines the space is the tape which the machine uses for reading, shifting or printing, and for Markov algorithms the space is the alphabet over which the algorithm operates. A Turing machine is assessed in terms of its effect on the tape, in particular the 'number' which it writes on the tape as its final output, and Markov algorithms are assessed in terms of their effect on words drawn from their alphabet, in particular their terminal production. In procedure theory we can assess procedures purely
in terms of their internal structure, and not in terms of their effect on any space external to them. ${ }^{2}$

Without pretending to give a formal definition, we can say that a procedure consists of a coherent, interconnected set of steps, where each step is either an operational step or a decision step or a structural step. Examples of each sort of step may be found in the homely realm of office procedures. Some of the operational steps are: banking in cash, sending out invoices, sending out account overdue notices. Some of the decision steps are: checking whether a correspondent is already mentioned in our files, checking whether an account is more than 60 days overdue, determining whether an amount ordered is held in stock. Structural steps are not quite so easy to find; some examples are: taking a file to the credit manager, returning unfilled orders to the orders file. Structural steps are usually carried out on the basis of the result of decision steps, and their effect is always internal to the procedure.

Inside the quadruples with which Turing machines are defined (see e.g. Hermes [4] p. 31) we may also find examples of each sort of step. A typical quadruple has the form

$$
q_{i} s_{j} o_{k} q_{i}
$$

where $q_{i}$ and $q_{i}$ denote internal states of the machine, $s_{j}$ denotes one of the symbols which may appear on the tape, and $o_{k}$ denotes a machine operation, which may be one of the symbols (for printing) or a shifting operation or a halting operation. In such a quadruple, $q_{i} s_{j}$ is a decision, since the quadruple is active only if the machine is in state $q_{i}$ and scanning symbol $s_{j}: o_{k}$ is an operation, which is carried out on the basis of the decision: and $q_{i}$, causes a structural step, since it causes the machine to shift into state $q_{i}$, which has no effect on anything external to the procedure.

As a sample of the way in which we may diagram a procedure, showing the interconnection of the three basic sorts of steps, consider Figure 1.


Figure 1. Enrollment Procedure

Each operational step is represented by a rectangular box, each decision step by an ovoid box and the two ${ }^{3}$ possible paths leading away from it, and the structural steps are represented by the passage from one occurrence of a numbered connector ${ }^{4}$ (in the small circles) to another.

Passage through the diagram is always from left to right, and from top to bottom; when we come to a numbered connector with nothing following, we pass to the other occurrence of a connector, with the same number, from which we may progress either towards the right or towards the bottom. Via the structural steps so defined, this procedure is iterative, e.g. if any department does not grant course approval then, via connector number 1, the procedure is iterated with a new form and new details.

In this first level of the theory of procedures, we will not treat iterative procedures of this sort. The present theory is constructed for the purposes of logical analysis of the properties of the simple conditional effect on operational steps given by decision steps, and in it there will be a minimum of structural steps. Indeed, there will be no explicit structural steps, and the only structural steps will be those implicitly involved in passing from one step in the procedure to another, or in ignoring a step if the condition for carrying out that step is not satisfied.

One semi-philosophical point is required before we proceed to the logic of procedures, and this concerns the expression of operations within operation steps. In general, we have to distinguish between an action itself, the doing of the action, the proposition that the action is done, a command or imperative that the action should be done, and the effect or result of the action's being done. Of these, we may rule out any consideration of effects or results, since we are operating in abstraction from any particular class of actions. We will use small Greek letters $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \alpha^{\prime} \ldots$ to refer to actions, and these will be interpreted as gerundive phrases such as "Your shutting the door" or "the adding of $x$ to $y$ '. We will write ' $D \alpha$ ' for the proposition that the action is done, or alternatively for the command "Do $\alpha$ !', often written as ' $!\alpha$ '. Although ' $D \alpha$ ' and ' $!$ ' must be clearly distinguished in general, they can be conflated for the purposes of procedure theory. This is because one must assume, in setting up a procedure, that just those actions which the procedure licenses or exhorts, and only those actions, will be done. Again, exhortation and licensing, or obligation and permission, coincide in procedure theory. Nothing is optional-there will be no steps saying to the office worker or the computer "You may do $\alpha$ here if you feel like it''. As a further remark on the equivalence of ' $D \alpha$ ' and ' $!\alpha$ ' for the purposes of procedure theory, we note that a procedure will have precisely the same structure, as far as the relation of operational steps and decision steps is concerned, when presented in the indicative mood as when presented in the imperative mood. If we were describing an office procedure to an outsider, we would use the indicative mood; if we were setting it out to the office staff who have to operate under it we would use the imperative mood, yet it would be precisely the same procedure in each case. One often thinks in terms of the imperative mood when addressing a computer; however computers have a somewhat naturalistic ethic, and
provided there are no technical difficulties, one has $!\alpha \equiv D \alpha$ for a com-puter-they do what they are told and only what they are told.

We will also quite often conflate $\alpha$ and $D \alpha$ in procedure theory, and the operator ' $D$ ' will often play little more part than a role as a punctuation sign. This conflation will only provide us with grammatical worries at an interpreted level; for purely manipulative reasons we will frequently conjoin and disjoin propositions and actions, where for ease of interpretation we should conjoin or disjoin propositions with propositions to the effect that an action is done.
2. Formalism for the first level of procedure theory.

## Primitives

1. (a) The letters $p, q, r, s, p^{\prime}, \ldots$ designated as propositional variables.
(b) 0 and 1 designated as propositional constants.
(c) $-, \&, \vee, \supset, \equiv$ designated as propositional operators.
2. The letters $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \alpha^{\prime}, \ldots$ designated as action variables.
3. (a) The letters $D$ and $E$
(b) The symbols $C^{i}$ for $i \geqslant 2$. ( $C^{2}$ will mostly be written as $C$ ).
4. (,) for use as parentheses.

## Formation Rules

1. (a) A propositional variable or constant standing alone is a well-formed proposition (wfp).
(b) If $P$ and $Q$ are wfps, then $(\bar{P}),(P \& Q),(P \vee Q),(P \supset Q),(P \equiv Q)$ are wfps. (Propositional operators are used autonomously in the metalanguage).
2. If $A$ is an action variable then ( $D A$ ) is a well-formed procedure expression at the first level (wfpe1).
3. If $P_{1} \ldots P_{n}$ are wfps, and $Y_{1} \ldots Y_{n}$ are wfpe1's, then $\left(C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} P_{2} Y_{2} \ldots\right.$ $\left.P_{n} Y_{n}\right)$ is a wfpe 1 , for $n \geqslant 2$.
4. If $X$ and $Y$ are wfpe1's, then ( $Y X$ ) is a wfpe1 (where juxtaposition in the metalanguage denotes juxtaposition in the object language).
5. If $X$ and $Y$ are wfpe1's, then $X E Y$ is a well-formed formula of procedure theory at level 1 (wff1).

When writing wfpe1's and wff1's, we will conventionally drop outside parentheses and others not needed to prevent ambiguity. Some sample wfpe1's, with some parentheses dropped, are
(i) $\quad((D \alpha)(D \beta))(D \gamma)$
(ii) $\quad\left(C^{3} p(D \alpha) q(D \beta) r(D \gamma)\right)$
(iii) $\quad(D \alpha)(C p((D \beta)(D \gamma)) q(D \delta))\left(D \delta^{\prime}\right)$
(iv) $C p D \beta 1 D \gamma$
(v) $\quad C p(D \alpha) q(C r(D \beta) s(D \gamma))$
3. The interpretation of wfpe 1 's. Each wfpe 1 can be interpreted as a description (or prescription) of a procedure. The (syntactical) order of occurrence of wfpe1's within a larger wfpe 1 determines the order in which each part is to be carried out. Thus (i) interprets as the simple unconditional procedure in which first $\alpha$, then $\beta$ and then $\gamma$ is done, or is to be done. This can be represented by a simple flow-chart as in Figure 2.


Figure 2.

Concatenation interprets, implicitly, as "and then", and this operator has intuitively the same formal properties as concatenation, namely associativity but not commutativity. If we take equivalence of procedures in an intuitive sense of 'having the same result', then ( $D \alpha)(D \beta)$ will not in general be equivalent to $(D \beta)(D \alpha)$. To borrow an example of Russell's, let $\alpha$ be putting on one's socks and $\beta$ be putting on one's boots. Then clearly doing $\alpha$ then doing $\beta$, i.e. $(D \alpha)(D \beta)$, does not have the same result as doing $\beta$ then doing $\alpha$, i.e. $(D \beta)(D \alpha)$. For actions within a Turing machine, we could let $\alpha$ be printing a ' + ', and $\beta$ be shifting right one square. Then $(D \alpha)(D \beta)$ will cause a ' + ' to be printed on the square to the left of that on which $(D \beta)(D \alpha)$ will cause ' + ' to be printed.

However, a sequence of simple $D$-expressions does associate; in fact this is implicit in the lack of parentheses in Figure 2. Hence we are justified in using juxtaposition (or, for formal syntactical purposes, concatenation) to express the operation of direct passage from one step to another in a procedure.

The symbols $C^{i}$ are our symbols for conditional expressions with in the procedure. They do not correspond directly with the ovoid boxes for representing decision steps on flow-charts, nor are they to be confused with material implication, for which we are using the ordinary PeanoRussellian ' $\supset$ '. The interpretation of a $C^{i}$-expression is formally identical to the interpretation of the if . . . then . . . else . . . conditional statementform in ALGOL ${ }^{5}$. The general form $C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} P_{2} Y_{2} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}$ is interpreted as the procedure of doing $Y_{1}$ if $P_{1}$ is true, or if $P_{1}$ is not true then doing $Y_{2}$ if $P_{2}$ is true, etc. In general, $P_{j} . \& . \bigwedge_{i<j} P_{i}$ is the condition under which $Y_{j}$ will be done according to the conditional procedure expressed by the wfpe1: $C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}$.

Under this interpretation, the question arises as to effect of such a conditional procedure if none of the $P_{i}$, for $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$ are true. In this case
we say that the procedure is not evaluable and generally we will confine our attention to evaluable procedures. We will apply these properties ambiguously to procedures and the wfpe1's which express them: a $C^{n}$ expression $C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}$ is defined to be evaluable if $\bigvee_{i=1}^{n} P_{i}$ is true. Of the evaluable $C^{\prime}$-expressions, there will be a subclass of logically evaluable $C^{n}$-expressions, which are those for which $\bigvee_{i=1}^{n} P_{i}$ is logically true. We will call a whole wfpe 1 evaluable if and only if all the $C^{n}$-expressions contained in it are evaluable, and logically evaluable, or simply logical, if and only if all the $C^{n}$-expressions contained in it are logically evaluable. Any procedure expressed by a wfpe 1 containing only $D$-expressions, such as our sample wfpe 1 (i), will be logical and a fortiori evaluable.

To facilitate the expression of logical procedures, we will introduce the symbol ' $\theta$ ', whose interpretation is, roughly, 'otherwise'. Just as 'otherwise' expresses a definite condition only in context, so we cannot give ' $\theta$ ' an explicit definition but instead we define it contextually. We require that ' $\theta$ ' can only occur in the $P_{n}$-place of a $C^{n}$-expression, and the contextual definition is

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { tual definition is } \\
& C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n-1} Y_{n-1} \theta Y_{n}={ }_{D f} C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n-1} Y_{n-1}\left(\overline{\left(\mathbf{V}_{i=1}^{n-1} P_{i}\right.}\right) Y_{n}
\end{aligned}
$$

It immediately follows that any $C^{n}$-expression containing ' $\theta$ ' is logically evaluable, since $\bigvee_{i=1}^{n-\frac{1}{V}} P_{i} . v . \bigvee_{i=1}^{n-1} P_{i}$ is logically true.

In fact, ' $\theta$ ' could be replaced by ' 1 ', and an equivalent procedure would result. In either case, $Y_{n}$ will be done if and only if none of $Y_{1} \ldots Y_{n-1}$ are done. Of course, any $C^{n}$-expression containing a ' 1 ' for any $P_{i}$, in particular $P_{r}$, will be logically evaluable, since 1 is a logical truth, and if $p$ is a logical truth then so is $p \vee q$. The point of using the ' $\theta$ ' symbol is that it gives the condition under which $Y_{n}$ is done, which we would not have if we used ' 1 ' in place of ' $\theta$ '.

With these remarks, we may now turn to a consideration of the interpretation of the wfpe1's (ii)-(v). The wfpe1 (ii) interprets as the conditional procedure of doing $\alpha$ if $p$ is true, doing $\beta$ if $q$ is true and $p$ is not true, and doing $\gamma$ if $\gamma$ is true and neither $p$ nor $q$ is true. As it stands, this procedure is not logical, since $p \vee q \vee r$ is not a logical truth. It would become logical if ' $r$ ' were replaced by ' $\theta$ ', or if an extra action were added, resulting in $C^{4} p D \alpha q D \beta r D \gamma \theta D \delta$. The flow-chart for this procedure is shown in Figure 3.

The portion above the dotted line is the original procedure, and the whole flow-chart is the procedure as made logical by the addition of ' $\theta D \delta$ '. Notice that we need add no decision step for ' $\theta$ ': the effect is the same as if ' 1 ' were written in place of ' $\theta$ ' and it is clearly otiose to ask if 1 is true. It is not otiose in general to ask if $(\overline{p \vee q \vee r)}$ is true, but given that we are only in a position to ask the question if neither $p$, nor $q$, nor $r$ is true then the question becomes otiose.


Figure 3.

The wfpe1's (iii), (iv) and (v) may be interpreted in a similar fashion, and represented by a flow-chart. (iv) is logical, but (iii) and (v) are not logical as they stand. (v) illustrates the point that the $Y_{i}$ 's in a $C^{n}$-expression do not have to be simple $D$-expressions or concatenations of them, but may themselves be $C^{m}$-expressions. In terms of the procedure expressed by such a wfpe1, this means that some decision steps may be followed by further decision steps rather than by an operational step.
4. The interpretation of wff1's. We now turn to the interpretation of wff1's, which are formed by infixing an ' $E$ ' between two wfpe1's. The intuitive interpretation of ' $E$ ' is as a proposition-forming operator on procedures; thus ' $X E Y$ ' is read as "Procedure $X$ is equivalent to procedure $Y$ ". Now ". . . is equivalent to . . ." is an explicandum which requires explication: the first step towards an explicatum ${ }^{6}$ is to spell the explicandum out into ". . . has the same results under the same conditions as . . .", and this in turn may be spelled out to ". . . causes (or prescribes) the same actions to be done, in the same order, for the same truth-values of the conditional propositions, as . . ." This latter form motivates the following precise definition of evaluation and equivalence.

Firstly, we give evaluation rules for wfpe1's in primitive notation, i.e. with all occurrences of ' $\theta$ ' removed by contextual definition. These are set up so that any $C^{n}$-expression $C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}$ which is not logically evaluable is treated as if it were $C^{n+1} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n} \theta\left(D \alpha_{0}\right)$ where $\alpha_{0}$ is the null action, i.e. the action of doing nothing. A wfpe 1 is evaluated with respect to a standard truth-tabular matrix, formed from all the distinct propositional variables appearing in $P$-places within the wfpe1. If the wfpe 1
contains no $C^{n}$-expressions, it has a one-row evaluation. For each row of the matrix, we evaluate a wfpe 1 according to the prescriptions:

1. The evaluation of $(X Y)$ is the evaluation of $X$ followed by the evaluation of $Y$.
2. The evaluation of $C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}$ is the evaluation of the first $Y_{i}$, for $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$, for which $P_{i}$ is true for the particular row of the matrix, and is nil if there is no such $P_{i}$. If any $P_{i}$ is a compound proposition, an ordinary truth-tabular calculation will be needed to determine its truth-value.
3. The evaluation of $D A$ is carried out by writing $A$ in the row of the matrix beneath its occurrence in the wfpe1.

These rules are obviously effective, in that at any stage during the evaluation of a wfpel, the rule to be used is fully determined, and whenever the evaluation of a compound wfpe 1 requires the evaluation of another wfpe 1 , the second wfpe 1 is shorter syntactically than the first and so the procedure must terminate. The evaluation procedure is itself a recursive procedure (or algorithm), of a type which cannot be expressed by a wfpe 1 (but which can be expressed at a more advanced level of procedure theory). Some sample evaluations are:


Now the evaluation of a wfpe1 sets out what actions are done (or prescribed) under all logically possible states of the conditional propositions within the wfpe1. In evaluation rule 3, it is required that the action variable $A$ should be written in the row of the evaluation beneath its occurrence in the wfpe1: hence the order of occurrence of the actions on any row of the evaluation will be the same as the order in which the actions are done within the procedure. Hence we may use the evaluation of wfpe1's to define their equivalence.

We will define $X E Y$ to be true if and only if each row of the evaluation of $X$ contains the same action variables in the same order as the corresponding row of the evaluation of $Y$, where $X$ and $Y$ are evaluated with respect to a matrix formed for the distinct propositional variables occurring either in $X$ or in $Y$. This definition is the explicatum of our original explicandum " $X$ is an equivalent procedure to $Y$ ". An example of a true wff1 is

$$
\left(C^{3} p D \alpha q D \beta \theta D \gamma\right) E(C p D \alpha \theta C q D \beta \theta D \gamma),
$$

as may be seen by checking the last two sample evaluations.

In the following sections we will assert that various wff1's are true without supplying any proof: in each case the proof is a routine matter using the evaluation rules of this section.
5. The eliminability of propositional operators. In this section we prove that for every logical wfpe 1 there exists an equivalent wfpe 1 which contains no propositional operators.

For the proof of this proposition, we note two preliminary results. Firstly, we note that every $C^{n}$-expression is equivalent to a wfpe 1 containing only $C^{2}$-expressions. This follows by a generalization of

$$
\left(C^{3} p D \alpha q D \beta r D \gamma\right) E\left(C^{2} p D \alpha \theta\left(C^{2} q D \beta \theta D \gamma\right)\right),
$$

which may be readily established by a truth-tabular evaluation. In general

$$
\left.\left(C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}\right) E C^{2} P_{1} Y_{1} \theta C^{2} P_{2} Y_{2} \theta \ldots \theta C^{2} P_{n-1} Y_{n-1} P_{n} Y_{n}\right)
$$

where the right-hand wfpe 1 contains $n-1 C^{2}$-expressions.
Secondly, we note that every logical $C^{2}$-expression of the form $C^{2} P_{1} Y_{1} P_{2} Y_{2}$ is equivalent to $C^{2} P_{1} Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}$. (It does not follow from this that $\theta=P_{2}$ ). Putting these two facts together gives the result that every logical $C^{n}$-expression is equivalent to an expression all of whose wellformed parts are of the form $C^{2} P_{1} Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}$.

Hence, to establish the required result that every logical wfpe is equivalent to a wfpe 1 containing no propositional operators, it suffices to show that all the propositional operators in a wfpe of the form $C^{2} P_{1} Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}$ may be eliminated, and to show that it suffices to show that we may eliminate the ' - ' from $C^{2} \bar{p} Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}$ and the ' $\&$ ' from $C^{2}(p \& q) Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}$. These latter eliminations are carried out using the equivalences

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left(C^{2} \bar{p} Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}\right) E\left(C^{2} p Y_{2} \theta Y_{1}\right) \\
\left(C^{2}(p \& q) Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}\right) E\left(C p\left(C q Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}\right) \theta Y_{2}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

and hence the required result is established. ${ }^{7}$
We do not retain this result if we insist that the wfpe 1 should be in primitive notation and contain no propositional operators. We can however assert, on the basis of the proof just given, that for every wfpe 1 there is a wfpe 1 in primitive notation containing no dyadic propositional operators. This follows since in each case where we expand a ' $\theta$ ' into primitive notation, we will introduce a negation operator, but no dyadic operators.
6. Normal Forms and a sufficient condition for complete axiomatizations. In this section we define explicit-conditional normal forms (ecnf's), and perfect explicit-conditional normal forms (pecnf's), and use them to derive a sufficient condition for complete axiomatizations of this level of procedure theory.

A wfpe1 is defined to be in explicit-conditional normal form iff either (a) it contains no $C^{n}$-expressions or (b) if it contains any $C^{n}$-expressions, then it contains just one, and this is the main operator of the wfpe 1 , so that it is of the form $C^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}$; and furthermore in this case each
$Y_{i}$ for $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$ (all of which are $D$-expressions or concatenations of them) is done if $Q_{i}$ is true.

A wfpe1 is defined to be in perfect explicit-conditional normal form if it is in ecnf and moreover each $Q_{i}$ for $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$ has the form of a statedescription (see [2] p. 9) in all the propositional variables occurring in the wfpe 1.

We require to prove that for every wfpe 1 there is an equivalent wfpe 1 which is in pecnf (and hence in ecnf). The first result we need is that for every $C^{n}$-expression of the form $C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}$ there is an equivalent $C^{n}$-expression of the form $C^{n} Q Y \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}$, in the evaluation of which each $Y_{i}$ is evaluated if the corresponding $Q_{i}$ is true. The rule for construction is: for each $i, 1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$, put $\frac{Q_{i}=P_{i}}{n-1}$.\&. $\bigwedge_{j<i} \overline{P_{j}}$. In particular, $Q_{1}=P_{1}$ and $Q_{n}=P_{n} . \& . \bigwedge_{j<n} \overline{P_{j}}=P_{n} . \& . \bigvee_{j=1}^{\overline{n-1}} P_{j}$ by DeMorgan's Law, so that if $P_{n}=\theta$ so does $Q_{n}$.

To show that $\left(C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}\right) E\left(C^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}\right)$ we use an appropriate generalization of (CpDaqD $) E(C p D \alpha(q \& \bar{p}) D \beta)$, which may be established in truth-tabular fashion. To show that for $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n, Y_{i}$ is evaluated if $Q_{i}$ is true, we see that this will be so if

$$
(\forall j)\left(1 \leqslant j<i . \supset \cdot Q_{i} \supset \bar{Q}_{j}\right),
$$

since if this holds then if $Q_{i}$ is true, no $Y_{j}$ for $1 \leqslant j<i$ will be evaluated, and so $Y_{i}$ will be evaluated. Now by definition

$$
Q_{i} \supset \bigwedge_{j<i} \bar{P}_{j}
$$

and also

$$
\bar{P}_{j} \supset \bar{Q}_{j}
$$

and hence

$$
Q_{i} \supset \bigwedge_{j<i} \bar{Q}_{j}
$$

and hence the required condition holds. We call this the condition of explicitness, which we may express using the Scheffer stroke function thus

$$
(\forall i)(\forall j)\left(i<n . \& . j<n . \& . i \neq j: \supset: Q_{i} \mid Q_{j}\right) .
$$

Whenever this holds we will write $C^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}$ as $C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}$, the subscript ' $e$ ' indicating that the conditional wfpe1 is explicit. Since $p \mid \bar{p}$, we always have $C_{e}^{2} P_{1} Y_{1} \theta Y_{2}$ as a particular case of explicit conditional expressions.

Hence, since for any $C^{n}$-expression there is an equivalent $C^{n}$-expression, if we now show how any wfpe 1 may be transformed into an equivalent $C^{n}$-expression if it contains any $C^{m}$-expression, then we will have given a procedure for placing any wff into ecnf.

Theorem: For any wfpe1 there is an equivalent wfpe1 containing at most one $C^{n}$-expression where that $C^{n}$ is the main operator.

Proof: The proof is by induction and the basis established immediately since $D A$ contains no $C^{n}$-expression if $A$ is an action variable. Next, we make the inductive hypothesis that each $Y_{i}$ contains at most one $C^{m}$-expression, and consider $C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}$. Let $Y_{j}, 1 \leqslant j \leqslant n$, be the first $Y_{i}$ in this $C^{n}$-expression to contain a $C^{m}$-expression (if there is no such $Y_{j}$, then clearly there is nothing to prove). Let $Y_{j}=C^{m} R_{1} Z_{1} \ldots R_{m} Z_{m}$, for from the inductive hypothesis, if $Y_{j}$ contains a $C^{m}$-expression then that $C^{m}$ is its main operator. Now consider the $C^{r}$-expression, where $r=n-1+m$ :

$$
C^{r} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots\left(P_{j} \& R_{1}\right) Z_{1}\left(P_{j} \& R_{2}\right) Z_{2} \ldots\left(P_{j} \& R_{m}\right) Z_{m} \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}
$$

this $C^{r}$-expression results from the $C^{n}$-expression by substituting $\left(P_{j} \& R_{1}\right) Z_{1} \ldots\left(P_{j} \& R_{m}\right) Z_{m}$ for $P_{j} Y_{j}$. We require to show that this expression is equivalent to $C^{n} P_{1} Y_{1} \ldots P_{j}\left(C^{m} R_{1} Z_{1} \ldots R_{m} Z_{m}\right) \ldots P_{n} Y_{n}$. Now so far as the pairs $P_{i} Y_{i}$, for $i \neq j$, are concerned, the $C^{r}$-expression is identical to the $C^{n}$-expression, so we need consider only the pairs occurring in the $j$ th to $(j+m-1)$ th positions of the $C^{r}$-expression, and show this portion equivalent to the $j$ th pair of the $C^{n}$-expression. The required equivalence holds here because of an appropriate generalization of the equivalence

$$
\left(C^{3} p D \alpha q(C r D \beta s D \gamma) p^{\prime} D \alpha^{\prime}\right) E\left(C^{4} p D \alpha(q \& r) D \beta(q \& s) D \gamma p^{\prime} D \alpha^{\prime}\right),
$$

and hence we have shown that the $C^{r}$-expression is equivalent to the $C^{n}$ expression and contains one less $C^{m}$-expression. By repeating the formation of such $C^{r}$-expressions, we may remove all $C^{m}$-expressions from the $C^{n}$-expression, except the final $C^{r}$-expression which constitutes the main operator. Hence this inductive step is established.

Next we prove two lemmas, to be used in establishing the inductive step for concatenation. The first lemma states that if a $C_{e}$-expression $C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}$ satisfies the distinctness condition

$$
(\forall i)(\forall j)\left(1 \leqslant i, j \leqslant n . \& . i \neq j: \supset: Y_{i} \neq Y_{j}\right),
$$

then $Q_{i} Y_{i}$ pairs may be permuted within that $C_{e}$-expression: i.e. given the distinctness condition then

$$
\left(C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{i} Y_{i} \ldots Q_{j} Y_{j} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}\right) E\left(C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{j} Y_{j} \ldots Q_{i} Y_{i} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}\right)
$$

This is immediate once we observe that in a $C_{e}$-expression satisfying the distinctness condition, $Y_{i}$ will be evaluated if and only if $Q_{i}$ is true, so that the position in which $Q_{i} Y_{i}$ appears is immaterial to the evaluation of the expression.

The second lemma states that for any $C_{e}^{n}$-expression, there is an equivalent $C_{e}$-expression satisfying the distinctness condition. To prove this, let $Y_{i}=Y_{j}$ for some $i<j$ in $C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}$. Then we have

$$
\left(C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}\right) E\left(C_{e}^{n-1} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots\left(Q_{i} \vee Q_{j}\right) Y_{i} \ldots Q_{j-1} Y_{j-1} Q_{j+1} Y_{j+1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}\right)
$$

and on the right-hand side of this equivalence, $Y_{j}$ no longer appears and so does not cause the expression to fail the distinctness condition. If $n=2$, then we use the equivalence ( $\left.C_{e}^{2} Q_{1} Y_{1} Q_{2} Y_{1}\right) E\left(C_{e}^{2} 1 Y_{1} O D \alpha^{\prime}\right)$, where $\alpha^{\prime}$ is an action-variable appearing nowhere else in the expression.

Now we may make the inductive hypothesis, that $X$ and $Y$ are in ecnf, and consider ( $X Y$ ). We may assume that both $X$ and $Y$ contain just one $C$-expression each, since we can use the equivalence ( $D \alpha) E\left(C 1 D \alpha O D \alpha^{\top}\right)$, where $\alpha^{\prime}$ is an active-variable occurring nowhere else in $X$ or $Y$, to introduce artificially a $C$-expression if one of them does not already contain one. (If neither $X$ nor $Y$ contains a $C$-expression, there is nothing to prove). Further, we may assume that each of these $C$-expressions is explicit, and then by the second lemma we may assume that each of them satisfies the distinctness condition as well. Under these assumptions, we set

$$
X=C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{1} Y_{1}, \quad Y=C_{e}^{m} Q_{1}^{\prime} Y_{1}^{\prime} \ldots Q_{m}^{\prime} Y_{m}^{\prime}
$$

Now, for $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$ and $1 \leqslant j \leqslant m$, put

$$
Q_{i j}=\left(Q_{i} \& Q_{j}^{\prime}\right), \quad Y_{i j}=\left(Y_{i} Y_{j}^{\prime}\right)
$$

Now consider the $C^{n \times m}$-expression

$$
C^{n \times m} Q_{11} Y_{11} Q_{12} Y_{12} \ldots Q_{1 m} Y_{1 m} Q_{21} Y_{21} \ldots Q_{n m} Y_{n m} .
$$

According to the inductive hypothesis, each $Y_{i j}$ contains no $C$-expressions, and hence the $C^{n \times m}$-expression obeys the required conditions. We require to show that it is equivalent to ( $X Y$ ) to establish the inductive step.

Let us observe firstly that the $C^{n \times m}$-expression is explicit if both the $C^{n}$ and the $C^{m}$-expressions are explicit. To show that the $C^{n \times m}$-expression is explicit, we have to show that the distinct $Q_{i j}$ 's are incompatible, i.e.,

$$
i \neq k . v . j \neq l: \supset: Q_{i j} \mid Q_{k l}
$$

By definition, this becomes $i \neq k . v . j \neq 1: \supset: Q_{i} \& Q_{j}^{\prime} . \mid . Q_{k} \& Q_{l}^{\prime}$
By hypothesis

$$
i \neq k . \supset \cdot Q_{i} \mid Q_{k}
$$

and

$$
j \neq 1 . \supset . Q_{j}^{\prime} \mid Q_{l}^{\prime},
$$

hence

$$
i \neq k . v . j \neq 1 . \supset \cdot Q_{i}\left|Q_{k} . v . Q_{j}^{\prime}\right| Q_{l}^{\prime} .
$$

Also,

$$
p|q \cdot v \cdot r| s: \supset: p \& r \cdot \mid \cdot q \& s
$$

is a tautology, and by substitution we have

$$
Q_{i}\left|Q_{k} \cdot \vee \cdot Q_{j}^{\prime}\right| Q_{l}^{\prime}: \supset: Q_{i} \& Q_{j}^{\prime} . \mid \cdot Q_{k} \& Q_{l}^{\prime},
$$

and hence by syllogism we have the required result.
Further, the $C^{n \times m}$-expression will also satisfy the distinctness condition if both $X$ and $Y$ do. Hence in the $C^{n \times m}$-expression, the order of writing the $Q_{i j} Y_{i j}$ pairs is immaterial, and $Y_{i j}$ will be evaluated if and only if $Q_{i j}$ is true, that is, iff $Q_{i}$ and $Q_{j}^{\prime}$ are true. That is, $Y_{i}$ and then $Y_{j}^{\prime}$ will be evaluated iff $Q_{i}$ and $Q_{j}^{\prime}$ are true. But this is precisely the case for $(X Y)$, which is

$$
\left(\left(C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}\right)\left(C_{e}^{m} Q_{1}^{\prime} Y_{1}^{\prime} \ldots Q_{m}^{\prime} Y_{m}^{\prime}\right)\right)
$$

and hence the required equivalence holds.

Hence we have completed the proof that for every wfpe 1 there is an equivalent wfpe 1 in ecnf. In order to perfect an ecnf we simply note the result from propositional calculus that every truth-function, ${ }^{8} \phi\left(p_{1}, \ldots, p_{n}\right)$ say, may be expressed as a disjunction $\bigvee_{i}$, where each $s_{i}$ is a statedescription in the $n$ propositional variables $p_{1}, \ldots, p_{n}$. In any ecnf, we replace each propositional function by such a disjunction, and then we apply repeatedly the equivalence ${ }^{9}\left(C_{e}(p \vee q) D \alpha \theta D \beta\right) E\left(C_{e} p D \alpha q D \alpha \theta D \beta\right)$ in order to derive a pecnf. For any logical wfpe1, its pecnf will be a $C^{2^{n}}$-expression, where $n$ is the number of propositional variables occurring in the wfpe1. (Appendix A contains a full-scale worked example of reduction of a wfpe 1 to pecnf.)

Perfect explicit-conditional normal forms mirror the evaluation of a wfpe1 in much the same way as perfect disjunctive normal forms in propositional calculus mirror the ordinary truth-tables. Both pecnf and an evaluation set out the actions which are done under the conditions given by a state-description in the propositional variables concerned. From this it follows that if $X E Y$, then the pecnf of $X$ is identical (within the order of the terms, and this may be made unequivocal by a suitable lexicographic convention) to the pecnf of $Y$.

Hence any formal system whose wff's are our wff1's, and whose axioms and rules of derivation are sufficient to ensure that $E$ is an $R S T$ relation and that the pecnf metatheorem holds with respect to the system, will be complete with respect to the set of true wff1's as determined by the evaluation procedure. For, if $X E Y$, then the pecnf's are identical. We then express the (identical) pecnfs by a wff of the formal system, $A$ say. Then $A E A$ is a theorem of the system if $E$ is reflexive. Then we apply the pecnf procedure to each side of this equivalence, but in reverse, so that we transform $A$ on one side into a wff, $X^{\prime}$, expressing $X$, and on the other side into a wff, $Y^{\prime}$, expressing $Y$. If $E$ is $R S T$, then $X^{\prime} E Y^{\prime}$ will be a theorem of the system, and hence the system is complete.

This then is our sufficient condition for completeness of axiom sets for procedure theory at level 1. Such an axiom set will also be decidable, for similar reasons. Any number of axiom sets will satisfy the condition: the simplest but least elegant way is to take as axiom schemata the general principles such as

$$
\left(C_{e}^{n} Q_{1} Y_{1} \ldots Q_{n} Y_{n}\right)\left(C_{e}^{m} Q_{1}^{\prime} Y_{1}^{\prime} \ldots Q_{m}^{\prime} Y_{m}^{\prime}\right) E\left(C^{n \times m} Q_{11} Y_{11} \ldots Q_{n m} Y_{n m}\right)
$$

which were needed in our informal pecnf proof. Or else we can take restricted versions of these, and prove the more general schemata using induction in the metalanguage. The choice of axiom sets depends upon our purpose, in particular whether the formal system is to be used for deriving theorems or for metatheoretic investigations. Since we are going to do neither of these in this paper, we leave open the choice of any particular set of axioms.

## APPENDIX A

Take the wfpel:
$\Psi=C(p C q D \alpha \theta D \beta)\left(\theta C(r C q D \alpha \theta D \gamma)\left(\theta(C p D \alpha \theta D \delta)\left(C s D \alpha^{\prime} \theta D \delta^{\prime}\right)\right)\right)$.
Write $\Psi$ as

$$
\Psi=C p(C q D \alpha \theta D \beta) \theta(C r A \theta B)
$$

Remove $\theta$ 's, and we get

$$
\Psi=C p(C q D \alpha \bar{q} D \beta) \bar{p}(C r A \bar{r} B) .
$$

Now we have an instance of the case in the first inductive step. We "distribute" $p$ and $\bar{p}$ according to the formula there, and derive

$$
\Psi E C^{4}(p \& q) D \alpha(p \& \bar{q}) D \beta(\bar{p} \bar{r}) B
$$

Now $B=(C p D \alpha \theta D \delta)\left(C s D \alpha^{\prime} \theta D \delta^{\prime}\right)=(C p D \alpha \bar{p} D \delta)\left(C s D \alpha^{\prime} \bar{s} D \delta^{\prime}\right)$
This is now an instance of the case in the second inductive step. We put

$$
Y_{11}=\left(D \alpha D \alpha^{\prime}\right), Y_{12}=\left(D \alpha D \delta^{\prime}\right), Y_{21}=\left(D \delta D \alpha^{\prime}\right), Y_{22}=\left(D \delta D \delta^{\prime}\right)
$$

and

$$
Q_{11}=p \& s, Q_{12}=(p \& \bar{s}), Q_{21}=(\bar{p} \& s), Q_{22}=(\bar{T} \& \bar{s})
$$

Then $B$ is equivalent to

$$
C^{2 \times 2} Q_{11} Y_{11} Q_{12} Y_{12} Q_{21} Y_{21} Q_{22} Y_{22}
$$

i.e.

$$
C^{4}(p \& s)\left(D \alpha D \alpha^{\prime}\right)(p \& \bar{s})\left(D \alpha D \delta^{\prime}\right)(\bar{p} \& s)\left(D \delta D \alpha^{\prime}\right)(\bar{p} \& \bar{s})\left(D \delta D \delta^{\prime}\right)
$$

Now we put this for $B$ in $\Psi$, and $A=C q D \alpha \theta D \gamma$, and then we use the method of the first inductive step again. Expanding over $A$ first we have
$\Psi E C^{5}(p \& q) D \alpha(p \& \bar{q}) D \beta(\bar{D} \& r \& q) D \alpha(\bar{T} \& r \& \bar{q}) D \gamma(\bar{D} \& \bar{r}) B$
Then by expanding over $B$
$\Psi E C^{8}(p \& q) D \alpha(p \& \bar{q}) D \beta(\bar{p} \& r \& q) D \alpha(\bar{T} \& r \& \bar{q}) D \gamma(\bar{p} \& \bar{r} \& p \& s)\left(D \alpha D \alpha^{\prime}\right)$
$(\bar{p} \& \bar{r} \& p \& \bar{s})\left(D \alpha D \delta^{\prime}\right)(\bar{p} \& \bar{r} \& \bar{p} \& s)\left(D \delta D \alpha^{\prime}\right)(\bar{p} \& \bar{r} \& \bar{p} \& \bar{s})\left(D \delta D \delta^{\prime}\right)$
Now we remove a couple of terms with contradictory expressions in $P$-place, and get $\Psi E C^{6}(p \& q) D \alpha(p \& \bar{q}) D \beta(\bar{p} \& r \& q) D \alpha(\bar{p} \& r \& \bar{q}) D \gamma(\bar{p} \& \bar{r} \& s)\left(D \delta D \alpha^{\prime}\right)(\bar{p} \& \bar{r} \& \bar{s})$
( $D \delta D \delta^{\prime}$ )
We now have obtained an ecnf for $\Psi$, since it may be checked that the wfpe 1 is an explicit conditional. The perfection process yields

$$
\begin{array}{rrr}
C^{16} & (p \& q \& r \& s) & (D \alpha) \\
(p \& q \& r \& \bar{s}) & (D \alpha) \\
(p \& q \& \bar{r} \& s) & (D \alpha) \\
(p \& q \& \bar{r} \& \bar{s}) & (D \alpha) \\
(p \& \bar{q} \& r \& s) & (D \beta)
\end{array}
$$

| $(p \& \bar{q} \& r \& \bar{s})$ | $(D \beta)$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $(p \& \bar{q} \& \bar{r} \& s)$ | $(D \beta)$ |
| $(p \& \bar{q} \& \bar{r} \& \bar{s})$ | $(D \beta)$ |
| $(\bar{p} \& q \& r \& s)$ | $(D \alpha)$ |
| $(\bar{p} \& q \& r \& \bar{s})$ | $(D \alpha)$ |
| $(\bar{p} \& q \& \bar{r} \& s)$ | $\left(D \delta D \delta^{\prime}\right)$ |
| $(\bar{p} \& q \& \bar{r} \& \bar{s})$ | $\left(D \delta D \delta^{\prime}\right)$ |
| $(\bar{p} \& \bar{q} \& r \& s)$ | $(D \gamma)$ |
| $(\bar{p} \& \bar{q} \& r \& \bar{s})$ | $(D \gamma)$ |
| $(\bar{p} \& \bar{q} \& \bar{r} \& s)$ | $\left(D \delta D \alpha^{\prime}\right)$ |
| $(\bar{p} \& \bar{q} \& \bar{r} \& \bar{s})$ | $\left(D \delta D \delta^{\prime}\right)$ |

after a little re-arrangement, and this is the pecnf in systematic form. The wfpel $\Psi$ is logical, containing as it does a liberal sprinkling of ' $\theta$ ' 's, and hence its pecnf is a $C^{2^{n}}=C^{2}=C^{16}$-expression.

## NOTES

1. For descriptions of Turing machines and Markov algorithms, see respectively Hermes [4] and Markov [5].
2. That is, we will do this until we explicitly assume a result space, when we will be able to assess procedures in terms of their external effects on this space. Result spaces will not be introduced in this paper.
3. In general, there is no reason why there should be only two possible branches from a decision. E.g. we could ask "For what month is the procedure being carried out?'', and this would lead to a twelve-fold branch. However, all such decisions could be carried out by means of a series of two-branch decisions, in the sample case by a series of decisions beginning "Is this for January?" and ending "Is this for November?", and two-branch decisions are obviously more amenable to treatment by a logic of a propositional style.
4. For a general description of the use of this sort of diagram ('flowchart') in computer programming, and for some history of computing lagniappe, see Goldstine and von Neumann [3].
5. For which, see McCracken [8], or any commercial programming manual for ALGOL.
6. These technical terms are, of course, Carnap's. See, e.g. Carnap [1] pp. 1-8.
7. The normal form of a wfpe 1 which results after all eliminations of propositional operators have been carried out corresponds to McCarthy's 'canonical form for generalized Boolean functions', McCarthy [6] p. 56. McCarthy does not define a normal form corresponding to our explicit conditional normal form in section (4), and does not discuss the question of completeness of his axiom set.
8. Provided it is not a contradiction, in which case it may be removed in virtue of ( $\left.C^{3} p D \alpha O D \beta \theta D \gamma\right) E(C p D \alpha \theta D \gamma)$, and similar equivalences and generalizations of them.
9. This equivalence is stated in terms of an explicit conditional, rather than any $C$-expression, since for example the following two wfpe1's are not equivalent

$$
C^{3}(p \vee q) D \alpha q D \beta \theta D \gamma, C^{4} p D \alpha q D \beta q D \alpha \theta D \gamma
$$

For $C_{e}$-expressions, it is immaterial where the two terms resulting from a separation of a disjunction are placed, and this facilitates the systematic arrangement of the terms in a pecnf.

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