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# DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES FROM PARTICULAR TO GENERAL

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In *Choice and Chance* [2], Skyrms attacks the view that all deductively valid arguments proceed from the general to the specific or particular.[1] He offers the following as an example of a deductively valid argument proceeding from particular to general.

> One is a lucky number.
> Three is a lucky number.
> Five is a lucky number.
> Seven is a lucky number.
> Nine is a lucky number.
> ---
> All odd numbers between 0 and 10 are lucky.

This argument is not a satisfactory example. In some current senses of the term 'valid,' it is not a valid argument.[2] Those who hold it to be valid will admit that its validity cannot be demonstrated by the techniques of formal logic.

By adding the following premise we transform the argument into one whose validity is formally demonstrable:

> Each odd number between 0 and 10 is identical to 1 or 3 or 5 or 7 or 9.

However, the resulting argument is not an example of an inference from particular to general, since it proceeds from particular-and-general to general.

We offer an example of a formally demonstrable argument which proceeds from particular to general:

> Kim is not a European.
>
> Anyone related only to Europeans is not related to everyone.

1. P. 13. On this issue see also [1], especially pp. 186-195.
2. See [3], pp. 64-69.

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## REFERENCES

[1] Łukasiewicz, Jan, "Comments on Nicod's Axiom and on 'Generalizing Deduction,'" *Selected Works*, edited by L. Borkowski, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam (1970).

[2] Skyrms, Brian, *Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic*, Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, California (1966).

[3] Suppes, Patrick, *Introduction to Logic*, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York (1957).

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