

A NOTE ON E

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Since there is no characteristic matrix for E so far, there is no possibility of investigating whether E has the finite model property in the sense of [1]. The aim of this note is to prove that for any wff D of E there is a finite set of wffs having properties similar to some properties of a finite model.

I shall suppose that E is formulated as in [2] or [3], but I shall write \neg for negation instead of $\bar{}$. Let X_1, X_2, \dots be the sequence of all finite non-empty sets of wffs of E. If $X_i = \{A_1, \dots, A_n\}$, $i = 1, 2, \dots$, then \bar{X}_i shall denote the wff $A_1 \& \dots \& A_n$. Let us write X instead of X_i . X will be called *consistent* iff $\neg_E \neg \bar{X}$; X is *inconsistent* iff $\vdash_E \neg \bar{X}$. Clearly, if X is consistent, then for no wff $B \vdash_E \bar{X} \rightarrow B \& \neg B$.

Lemma 1. *For any X, B and C , if X is consistent and $\vdash_E \bar{X} \rightarrow B \vee C$, then either $X \cup \{B\}$ or $X \cup \{C\}$ is consistent.*

Proof. Suppose that the contrary is the case. Then we have both $\vdash_E \neg(\bar{X} \& B)$ and $\vdash_E \neg(\bar{X} \& C)$. By adjunction we obtain $\vdash_E \neg(\bar{X} \& B) \& \neg(\bar{X} \& C)$ and thus $\vdash_E \neg(\bar{X} \& B \vee \bar{X} \& C)$. But then we easily derive $\vdash_E \neg(\bar{X} \& (B \vee C))$ and $\vdash_E \neg \bar{X} \vee \neg(B \vee C)$. Since $\vdash_E \bar{X} \rightarrow B \vee C$, we have $\vdash_E \neg(B \vee C) \rightarrow \neg \bar{X}$. Therefore, $\vdash_E \neg \bar{X}$, contrary to the assumption of the lemma.

Lemma 2. *For all X, B, C and D , if $\vdash_E \bar{X} \rightarrow B \vee C$ and $\neg_E \bar{X} \rightarrow D$, then either $\neg_E \bar{X} \& B \rightarrow D$ or $\neg_E \bar{X} \& C \rightarrow D$.*

Proof. Suppose that both $\vdash_E \bar{X} \& B \rightarrow D$ and $\vdash_E \bar{X} \& C \rightarrow D$. We first easily obtain $\vdash_E (\bar{X} \& B) \vee (\bar{X} \& C) \rightarrow D$ and then $\vdash_E \bar{X} \& (B \vee C) \rightarrow D$. Since $\vdash_E \bar{X} \rightarrow B \vee C$, we have $\vdash_E \bar{X} \rightarrow \bar{X} \& (B \vee C)$ and thus $\vdash_E \bar{X} \rightarrow D$, contrary to the hypothesis of the lemma.

Let D be an arbitrary wff of E, let $P^+(D)$ be the set of all subformulae of D , let $P^-(D)$ be the set of all negations of the wffs of $P^+(D)$ and let $P(D) = P^+(D) \cup P^-(D)$. Furthermore, let $\chi(D) = \{C_j \vee \neg C_j; C_j \in P^+(D)\}$, for all $1 \leq j \leq r$, where r is the number of subformulae of D . In the sequel I shall consider only the members Y_1, \dots, Y_{2r} of the sequence X_1, X_2, \dots satisfying the following two conditions:

- (1) $X(D) \subseteq Y_k$
- (2) $Y_k \subseteq P(D)$,

$1 \leq k \leq 2^{2r}$. If $Y_m \subseteq Y_n$, then Y_n is called an *extension* of Y_m . Thus, every Y_k is an extension of $X(D)$. Let us write Y instead of Y_k , $1 \leq k \leq 2^{2r}$ and C instead of C_j , $1 \leq j \leq 2r$, and let us introduce Y' , Y'' , Z , etc., for the same purpose.

A set Y will be called *D-normal* iff it is consistent and for every $C \in P^+(D)$ either $C \in Y$ or $\neg C \in Y$.

Lemma 3. *For any consistent Y there is a D -normal extension Z .*

Proof. Since $X(D) \subseteq Y$, we have $\vdash_E \bar{Y} \rightarrow C \vee \neg C$, for all $C \in P^+(D)$. By Lemma 1, either $Y' = Y \cup \{C\}$ or $Y'' = Y \cup \{\neg C\}$ is consistent. Since $X(D)$ is finite, repeating the same argument we could show that there is a D -normal extension Z of Y .

I shall note that the preceding lemma states only the existence of a D -normal extension Z of Y ; it does not provide a construction of Z given Y .

Let M_D be the set of all normal extensions of $X(D)$. Obviously, M_D is not empty. Let us say that $C \in P(D)$ is *valid* in M_D iff $C \in Y$ for all $Y \in M_D$; it is *refutable* in M_D iff there is an Y such that $C \notin Y$.

Lemma 4. *For all $C \in P(D)$, if $\neg_E C$, then C is refutable in M_D .*

Proof. If $\neg_E C$, then $\neg_E \bar{X}(D) \rightarrow C$. But $\vdash_E \bar{X}(D) \rightarrow C \vee \neg C$. Therefore, by Lemma 2, $\neg_E \bar{X}(D) \& \neg C \rightarrow C$. I have to show that $X(D) \cup \{\neg C\}$ is consistent. Suppose that the contrary is the case. Then $\vdash_E \neg \bar{X}(D) \vee \neg \neg C$ and by the rule γ (see [4]), since $\vdash_E \bar{X}(D)$, we have $\vdash_E \neg \neg C$ and thus $\vdash_E C$, contrary to the hypothesis that $\neg_E C$. By Lemma 3 there is a D -normal extension of $X(D) \cup \{\neg C\}$. Therefore, there is an $Y \in M_D$ such that $C \notin Y$, and C is thus refutable in M_D .

Corollary. *If $C \in P(D)$ is valid in M_D , then $\vdash_E C$.*

Lemma 5. *For all $C \in P(D)$, if $\vdash_E C$, then C is valid in M_D .*

Proof. Suppose that C is not valid in M_D . Then there is an $Y \in M_D$ such that $\neg C \in Y$. Obviously, $\vdash_E \bar{Y} \rightarrow \neg C$. But $\vdash_E Y \rightarrow \neg C \rightarrow .C \rightarrow \neg \bar{Y}$ and thus $\vdash_E C \rightarrow \neg \bar{Y}$. Now if $\vdash_E C$, we have $\vdash_E \neg \bar{Y}$ and Y is inconsistent, which is impossible, since $Y \in M_D$. Therefore, $\neg_E C$, and this proves the lemma.

REFERENCES

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