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DOES QUOTATION SOMETIMES PERMIT SUBSTITUTION?

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At the end of his discussion of the referential opacity of quotation, in §30 of *Word and Object* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1960), Quine remarks,

> It would be wrong to suppose that an occurrence of a term within an opaque construction is barred from referential position in every broader context. Examples to the contrary are provided by the occurrences of the personal name in:
>
> (8) "Tully was a Roman" is true,
> (9) "Tully" refers to a Roman.
>
> Despite the opacity of quotation, these occurrences of the personal name are clearly subject to substitutivity of identity *salva veritate*, thanks to the peculiarities of the main verbs involved. (p. 146)

A similar passage appears in 'Reference and Modality' (*From a Logical Point of View*, Harper Torchbooks, 1963), following which Quine adds,

> The examples . . . are exceptional in that the special predicates "is true" and ["refers"] have the effect of undoing the single quotes . . . (p. 141)

His point, I take it, is that (due to the referential transparency of the sentence contained by the quotes in (8)) the predicate of (8) (' . . . is true') continues in fact to be true of the subject (the sentence 'Tully was a Roman') under substitution of any other name of Tully for 'Tully'. And given the truth of (9), we know (trivially) that any term which corefers with 'Tully' will refer to a Roman; consequently the substitution of any such term for 'Tully' will in fact preserve the truth of (9).

So far, so good; but this point is at best misleading. Quine takes it to show that 'Tully' occurs *referentially* in (8) and in (9) (see the passages quoted above). But those occurrences of 'Tully' fail at least one crucial test for referentiality, suggested by Quine's own work—viz., the occurrences do not satisfy the inference-schema associated with Leibniz' Law:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l}\phi a \\ a = b\end{array}}{\phi b}$$

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Since this schema is valid in first-order logic, which Quine takes to be the logic of reference and predication, we (and presumably he) would expect purely referential singular terms to obey it. But let us replace 'ϕ' by '"... was a Roman" is true,' '*a*' by 'Tully,' and '*b*' by 'Cicero,' obtaining

'Tully was a Roman' is true
Tully = Cicero

'Cicero was a Roman' is true

This resulting argument is invalid. To see this, grant that the premises are true but suppose (contrary to fact) that 'Cicero' does not refer to Cicero—in such a case, the conclusion may still be false.

Similarly, replace 'ϕ' by '"... " refers to a Roman,' '*a*' by 'Tully,' and '*b*' by 'Cicero,' obtaining

'Tully' refers to a Roman
Tully = Cicero

'Cicero' refers to a Roman

This argument too is invalid, for the same reason: the conclusion would follow only with the aid of a factual assumption, such as that 'Tully' refers to Tully and 'Cicero' to Cicero.

Since satisfaction of the Leibnizian schema is surely a necessary condition of a construction's providing a purely referential position, 'Tully' does not occur in purely referential position in (8) or in (9). To see this more clearly, note that (8) and (9) actually make no mention of Tully himself; they could be true in worlds uninhabited by Tully and by anyone remotely like him. Therefore, contrary to what Quine contends, the 'special predicates' of (8) and (9) do not 'undo' the single quotes to the extent of allowing the names inside them to refer to Tully.

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