Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

On Some Mistaken Beliefs About Core Logic and Some Mistaken Core Beliefs About Logic

Neil Tennant

Abstract

This is in part a reply to a recent work of Vidal-Rosset, which expresses various mistaken beliefs about Core Logic. Rebutting these leads us further to identify, and argue against, some mistaken core beliefs about logic.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 59, Number 4 (2018), 559-578.

Dates
Accepted: 12 June 2016
First available in Project Euclid: 10 October 2018

https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1539137244

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1215/00294527-2018-0014

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR3871901

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
06996544

Citation

Tennant, Neil. On Some Mistaken Beliefs About Core Logic and Some Mistaken Core Beliefs About Logic. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 59 (2018), no. 4, 559--578. doi:10.1215/00294527-2018-0014. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1539137244

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