Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

On Some Mistaken Beliefs About Core Logic and Some Mistaken Core Beliefs About Logic

Neil Tennant

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This is in part a reply to a recent work of Vidal-Rosset, which expresses various mistaken beliefs about Core Logic. Rebutting these leads us further to identify, and argue against, some mistaken core beliefs about logic.

Article information

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 59, Number 4 (2018), 559-578.

Received: 23 June 2015
Accepted: 12 June 2016
First available in Project Euclid: 10 October 2018

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Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)

Zentralblatt MATH identifier

Primary: 03B20: Subsystems of classical logic (including intuitionistic logic)
Secondary: 03B47: Substructural logics (including relevance, entailment, linear logic, Lambek calculus, BCK and BCI logics) {For proof-theoretic aspects see 03F52} 03B53: Paraconsistent logics

transitivity natural deduction synonymy interdeducibility deduction theorem cut methodological adequacy


Tennant, Neil. On Some Mistaken Beliefs About Core Logic and Some Mistaken Core Beliefs About Logic. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 59 (2018), no. 4, 559--578. doi:10.1215/00294527-2018-0014.

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