Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

The Logical Strength of Compositional Principles

Richard G. Heck Jr.

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This paper investigates a set of issues connected with the so-called conservativeness argument against deflationism. Although I do not defend that argument, I think the discussion of it has raised some interesting questions about whether what I call “compositional principles,” such as “a conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true,” have substantial content or are in some sense logically trivial. The paper presents a series of results that purport to show that the compositional principles for a first-order language, taken together, have substantial logical strength, amounting to a kind of abstract consistency statement.

Article information

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 59, Number 1 (2018), 1-33.

Received: 4 September 2014
Accepted: 28 February 2015
First available in Project Euclid: 5 July 2017

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Digital Object Identifier

Primary: 03A05: Philosophical and critical {For philosophy of mathematics, see also 00A30}

truth compositionality Tarski deflationism


Heck Jr., Richard G. The Logical Strength of Compositional Principles. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 59 (2018), no. 1, 1--33. doi:10.1215/00294527-2017-0011.

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