Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Functional Dependence in Strategic Games

Kristine Harjes and Pavel Naumov

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The article studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equilibria of multiplayer strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a fixed dependency graph for payoff functions. A logical system describing properties of functional dependence for any given graph is proposed and is proven to be complete.

Article information

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 57, Number 3 (2016), 341-353.

Received: 20 March 2013
Accepted: 29 October 2013
First available in Project Euclid: 25 February 2016

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Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)

Zentralblatt MATH identifier

Primary: 03B80: Other applications of logic

strategic games functional dependency axiomatization completeness


Harjes, Kristine; Naumov, Pavel. Functional Dependence in Strategic Games. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 57 (2016), no. 3, 341--353. doi:10.1215/00294527-3479096.

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