Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
- Volume 57, Number 2 (2016), 287-327.
Restriction by Noncontraction
This paper investigates how naive theories of truth fare with respect to a set of extremely plausible principles of restricted quantification. It is first shown that both nonsubstructural theories as well as certain substructural theories cannot validate all those principles. Then, pursuing further an approach to the semantic paradoxes that the author has defended elsewhere, the theory of restricted quantification available in a specific naive theory that rejects the structural property of contraction is explored. It is shown that the theory validates all the principles in question, and it is argued that other prima facie plausible principles that the theory fails to validate are objectionable on independent grounds.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 57, Number 2 (2016), 287-327.
Received: 1 September 2012
Accepted: 14 October 2013
First available in Project Euclid: 28 January 2016
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Zardini, Elia. Restriction by Noncontraction. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 57 (2016), no. 2, 287--327. doi:10.1215/00294527-3429057. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1453993977