Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
- Volume 56, Number 1 (2015), 243-261.
Extensionalizing Intensional Second-Order Logic
Neo-Fregean approaches to set theory, following Frege, have it that sets are the extensions of concepts, where concepts are the values of second-order variables. The idea is that, given a second-order entity , there may be an object , which is the extension of X. Other writers have also claimed a similar relationship between second-order logic and set theory, where sets arise from pluralities.
This paper considers two interpretations of second-order logic—as being either extensional or intensional—and whether either is more appropriate for this approach to the foundations of set theory. Although there seems to be a case for the extensional interpretation resulting from modal considerations, I show how there is no obstacle to starting with an intensional second-order logic. I do so by showing how the operator can have the effect of “extensionalizing” intensional second-order entities.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 56, Number 1 (2015), 243-261.
First available in Project Euclid: 24 March 2015
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Payne, Jonathan. Extensionalizing Intensional Second-Order Logic. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 56 (2015), no. 1, 243--261. doi:10.1215/00294527-2835092. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1427202982