Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility

Gabriel Uzquiano

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We look at recent accounts of the indefinite extensibility of the concept set and compare them with a certain linguistic model of indefinite extensibility. We suggest that the linguistic model has much to recommend over alternative accounts of indefinite extensibility, and we defend it against three prima facie objections.

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Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 56, Number 1 (2015), 147-166.

First available in Project Euclid: 24 March 2015

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Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)

Zentralblatt MATH identifier

Primary: 00A30: Philosophy of mathematics [See also 03A05]
Secondary: 03E30: Axiomatics of classical set theory and its fragments 03A05: Philosophical and critical {For philosophy of mathematics, see also 00A30}

indefinite extensibility set plural quantification


Uzquiano, Gabriel. Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 56 (2015), no. 1, 147--166. doi:10.1215/00294527-2835056.

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