Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Thoroughly Relativistic Perspectives

Mark Ressler

Abstract

This article formulates five relative systems to evaluate the charge of self-refutation with regard to global relativism. It is demonstrated that all five of these systems support models with at least one thoroughly relativistic perspective. However, when these systems are extended to include an operator expressing the valuation of statements in a perspective, only one relative system, based on a nonnormal modal logic, supports a thoroughly relativistic perspective.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 53, Number 1 (2012), 89-112.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 9 May 2012

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1336586240

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1215/00294527-1626545

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR2925271

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
1248.03038

Subjects
Primary: 03B60: Other nonclassical logic
Secondary: 03H10: Other applications of nonstandard models (economics, physics, etc.)

Keywords
relativism nonnormal modal logic self-refutation

Citation

Ressler, Mark. Thoroughly Relativistic Perspectives. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 53 (2012), no. 1, 89--112. doi:10.1215/00294527-1626545. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1336586240


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