Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
- Volume 50, Number 3 (2009), 275-301.
$\in_I$: An Intuitionistic Logic without Fregean Axiom and with Predicates for Truth and Falsity
We present $\in_I$-Logic (Epsilon-I-Logic), a non-Fregean intuitionistic logic with a truth predicate and a falsity predicate as intuitionistic negation. $\in_I$ is an extension and intuitionistic generalization of the classical logic $\in_T$ (without quantifiers) designed by Sträter as a theory of truth with propositional self-reference. The intensional semantics of $\in_T$ offers a new solution to semantic paradoxes. In the present paper we introduce an intuitionistic semantics and study some semantic notions in this broader context. Also we enrich the quantifier-free language by the new connective < that expresses reference between statements and yields a finer characterization of intensional models. Our results in the intuitionistic setting lead to a clear distinction between the notion of denotation of a sentence and the here-proposed notion of extension of a sentence (both concepts are equivalent in the classical context). We generalize the Fregean Axiom to an intuitionistic version not valid in $\in_I$. A main result of the paper is the development of several model constructions. We construct intensional models and present a method for the construction of standard models which contain specific (self-)referential propositions.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 50, Number 3 (2009), 275-301.
First available in Project Euclid: 10 November 2009
Permanent link to this document
Digital Object Identifier
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
Zentralblatt MATH identifier
Lewitzka, Steffen. ∈ I : An Intuitionistic Logic without Fregean Axiom and with Predicates for Truth and Falsity. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 50 (2009), no. 3, 275--301. doi:10.1215/00294527-2009-012. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1257862039.