Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities

David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg

Abstract

Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 50, Number 2 (2009), 183-193.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 11 May 2009

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1242067709

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1215/00294527-2009-005

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR2535583

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
1181.60008

Subjects
Primary: 60A99: None of the above, but in this section

Keywords
probabilistic justification infinitism foundationalism conditional and unconditional probabilities

Citation

Atkinson, David; Peijnenburg, Jeanne. Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 50 (2009), no. 2, 183--193. doi:10.1215/00294527-2009-005. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1242067709


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