Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
- Volume 37, Number 4 (1996), 625-630.
Field on the Notion of Consistency
Field's claim that we have a notion of consistency which is neither model-theoretic nor proof-theoretic but primitive, is examined and criticized. His argument is compared to similar examinations by Kreisel and Etchemendy, and Etchemendy's distinction between interpretational and representational semantics is employed to reveal the flaw in Field's argument.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 37, Number 4 (1996), 625-630.
First available in Project Euclid: 16 December 2002
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Akiba, Ken. Field on the Notion of Consistency. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 37 (1996), no. 4, 625--630. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040046146. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1040046146