Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Field on the Notion of Consistency

Ken Akiba


Field's claim that we have a notion of consistency which is neither model-theoretic nor proof-theoretic but primitive, is examined and criticized. His argument is compared to similar examinations by Kreisel and Etchemendy, and Etchemendy's distinction between interpretational and representational semantics is employed to reveal the flaw in Field's argument.

Article information

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 37, Number 4 (1996), 625-630.

First available in Project Euclid: 16 December 2002

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Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)

Zentralblatt MATH identifier

Primary: 03A05: Philosophical and critical {For philosophy of mathematics, see also 00A30}
Secondary: 00A30: Philosophy of mathematics [See also 03A05]


Akiba, Ken. Field on the Notion of Consistency. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 37 (1996), no. 4, 625--630. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040046146.

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