Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Situations in Which Disjunctive Syllogism Can Lead from True Premises to a False Conclusion

S. V. Bhave

Abstract

Disjunctive Syllogism, that is, the inference from 'not-A or B' and 'A', to 'B' can lead from true premises to a false conclusion if each of the sentences 'A' and 'not-A' is a statement of a partial truth such that affirming one of them amounts to denying the other, without each being the contradictory of the other. Such sentences inevitably occur whenever a situation which for its proper precise description needs the use of expressions such as 'most probably true' and so forth, is described (less precisely) by sentences not containing such expressions.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 38, Number 3 (1997), 398-405.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 12 December 2002

https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039700746

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039700746

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR1624958

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0910.03003

Citation

Bhave, S. V. Situations in Which Disjunctive Syllogism Can Lead from True Premises to a False Conclusion. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38 (1997), no. 3, 398--405. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039700746. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039700746

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