## Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

### The Ontology of Impossible Worlds

David A. Vander Laan

#### Abstract

The best arguments for possible worlds as states of affairs furnish us with equally good arguments for impossible worlds of the same sort. I argue for a theory of impossible worlds on which the impossible worlds correspond to maximal inconsistent classes of propositions. Three objections are rejected. In the final part of the paper, I present a menu of impossible worlds and explore some of their interesting formal properties.

#### Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 38, Number 4 (1997), 597-620.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 10 December 2002

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039540772

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039540772

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR1648855

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0923.03015

#### Citation

Vander Laan, David A. The Ontology of Impossible Worlds. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38 (1997), no. 4, 597--620. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039540772. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039540772.

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