## Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

### Is Hume's Principle Analytic?

Crispin Wright

#### Abstract

One recent neologicist' claim is that what has come to be known as "Frege's Theorem"–the result that Hume's Principle, plus second-order logic, suffices for a proof of the Dedekind-Peano postulate–reinstates Frege's contention that arithmetic is analytic. This claim naturally depends upon the analyticity of Hume's Principle itself. The present paper reviews five misgivings that developed in various of George Boolos's writings. It observes that each of them really concerns not analyticity' but either the truth of Hume's Principle or our entitlement to accept it and reviews possible neologicist replies. A two-part Appendix explores recent developments of the fifth of Boolos's objections–the problem of Bad Company–and outlines a proof of the principle , an important part of the defense of the claim that what follows from Hume's Principle is not merely a theory which allows of interpretation as arithmetic but arithmetic itself.

#### Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 40, Number 1 (1999), 6-30.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 5 December 2002

https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039096303

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039096303

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR1811201

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0968.03009

#### Citation

Wright, Crispin. Is Hume's Principle Analytic?. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 40 (1999), no. 1, 6--30. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039096303. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039096303.

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