Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Toward a Theory of Second-Order Consequence

Augustín Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano


We develop an account of logical consequence for the second-order language of set theory in the spirit of Boolos's plural interpretation of monadic second-order logic.

Article information

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 40, Number 3 (1999), 315-325.

First available in Project Euclid: 28 May 2002

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Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)

Zentralblatt MATH identifier

Primary: 03C85: Second- and higher-order model theory
Secondary: 03A05: Philosophical and critical {For philosophy of mathematics, see also 00A30} 03B15: Higher-order logic and type theory


Rayo, Augustín; Uzquiano, Gabriel. Toward a Theory of Second-Order Consequence. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 40 (1999), no. 3, 315--325. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1022615612.

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