Journal of Symbolic Logic

The Friedman—Sheard programme in intuitionistic logic

Graham E. Leigh and Michael Rathjen

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Abstract

This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth.

Article information

Source
J. Symbolic Logic, Volume 77, Issue 3 (2012), 777-806.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 13 August 2012

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jsl/1344862162

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.2178/jsl/1344862162

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR2987138

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
1248.03081

Citation

Leigh, Graham E.; Rathjen, Michael. The Friedman—Sheard programme in intuitionistic logic. J. Symbolic Logic 77 (2012), no. 3, 777--806. doi:10.2178/jsl/1344862162. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jsl/1344862162


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